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The Settlement Trap
LINDSEY D. SIMON*
Mass tort victims often wait years for resolution of their personal injury claims, but
many who successfully navigate this arduous process will not receive a single dollar
of their settlement award. According to applicable bankruptcy and state law,
settlement payments may be an asset of the estate that the trustee, exercising its
significant authority, administers and distributes to creditors instead of a claimant
who had filed for bankruptcy. This distribution power maximizes repayment, a
critical counterbalance to the robust protections and benefits that debtors receive in
bankruptcy.
Setting aside the perceived unfairness of taking desperately needed money from
tort victims, there is something fundamentally unsettling about the process by which
bankruptcy law ensnares payment of mass tort settlements. This Article is the first to
identify the problem, which it dubs the “settlement trap.” Claimants in the settlement
trap must seek relief from the mass tort claims administrator, the trustee, and
potentially the bankruptcy court, facing costs and legal challenges at each turn. This
Article explores the developing law surrounding treatment of mass tort settlements
in consumer bankruptcy and identifies structural and doctrinal pressure points that
impose significant confusion and costs on claimants. It supplements legal analysis
with original interviews of stakeholders in the ongoing NFL concussion and pelvic
mesh cases, case studies that highlight the peculiar mix of incentives that impact
whether claimants receive their settlements and illustrate the potential for abuse.
Finally, the Article offers a blueprint for reform.

* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I am thankful to Beth
Burch, Mechele Dickerson, Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez, and Bob Lawless for feedback at
various stages of this project, and to the attendees at the Civil Procedure Workshop for their
helpful comments. This Article benefitted from the excellent research assistance of Gretchen
Edelman and Victoria Barbino. Any errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Susan1 and her husband James, a former National Football League (NFL) player,
had their world turned upside down when James was diagnosed with early onset
Alzheimer’s disease and related conditions. James died from these illnesses, and
soon thereafter Susan filed for bankruptcy. While her bankruptcy case was pending,
Susan joined the NFL concussion multidistrict litigation (MDL).2 After the NFL

1. Susan’s real name is not disclosed here, as portions of her case are still pending. As
described in more detail below, I collected the real-life stories in this paper through phone
interviews and email correspondence. I learned the specifics of Susan’s case through emails
from her personal injury attorney, who was outraged by the way her settlement award had
been captured.
2. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D.
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reached a global settlement resolving claims relating to traumatic brain injuries
suffered by its players, Susan went through the various procedural examinations and
evidentiary steps to secure an award of nearly $400,000. After costs, attorney’s fees,
and the money owed to her litigation finance company were taken out of the
settlement, Susan awaited approximately $20,000 of much-needed funds, a mere 5%
of her initial damages award. But Susan disclosed her bankruptcy, as required by the
NFL’s settlement form, and the trustee overseeing her bankruptcy case was entitled
to receive the settlement and pay it out to her creditors, leaving Susan without a
penny. Susan had fallen prey to the settlement trap.
Susan’s case is not exceptional; rather, it is the direct result of the straightforward
application of bankruptcy law. All property rights a debtor has as of the petition
date—including potential lawsuit settlement payments—belong to the bankruptcy
estate.3 The trustee, acting on behalf of the estate, has sole authority to pursue and
distribute settlement proceeds among creditors.4 This vested authority exists when
the lawsuit is settled while the bankruptcy case is ongoing and continues even when
a bankruptcy has been closed for a decade.5 This fact comes at a surprise to claimants
as well as non-bankruptcy attorneys. As explained by one plaintiff’s attorney, “once
a bankruptcy is done and gone, the claimant has put that all behind them. The last
thing they think is that proceeds of some award will be brought back by the trustee,
and the costs would be borne by them.” 6
Consider the experience of Tammie, a woman who had pelvic mesh surgically
implanted in the early 2000s to treat organ prolapse. A few years after her surgery,
Tammie filed for bankruptcy, and her case was closed in 2005. More than a decade
later, Tammie joined a mass litigation against the pelvic mesh manufacturer,
claiming that the product caused her many health problems. Tammie was shocked
when the bankruptcy trustee—a court-appointed representative of the estate in
consumer bankruptcies—moved to reopen her long-dormant bankruptcy case and
take control over the settlement. Even though nobody knew in the early 2000s that
Tammie’s pelvic mesh would cause her injuries, under some states’ laws, her claims
nevertheless still belong to the bankruptcy estate because the surgery implanting the
mesh occurred before she filed for bankruptcy. In other states, the personal injury
claim would not belong to the estate unless Tammie discovered the harm before
bankruptcy or unless her cause of action accrued under state law before bankruptcy.7
Claim accrual standards create instances where mass tort claimants are funneled back
into the bankruptcy system they left long ago.
All is not lost for mass tort victims like Susan and Tammie. The Bankruptcy
Code’s8 exemption provisions permit a consumer debtor to keep certain categories
of their assets away from the grasp of creditors. The fundamental principles are

Pa. 2016).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 544.
5. Id.
6. Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1 (Sept. 25, 2019).
7. Here, just as in many parts of discussion surrounding exemptions, choice of law
analysis can have significant implications for debtors. For a more detailed discussion of the
applicable laws, see infra Part I.C.1.
8. The Bankruptcy Code refers to Title 11 of the United States Code.
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simple: consumer bankruptcy is designed to give the honest but unfortunate debtor a
fresh start, and to do so the debtor must exit bankruptcy with some modest assets.9
Exemptions cover many things, from clothes to schooling materials to retirement
benefits. Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code provides federal exemptions, but also
allows individual states to create alternative exemptions that a debtor may elect.10
Mass tort personal injury settlement payments—the focus of this Article—may
fall within a number of exemptions. The exemption framework is complicated, and
minor distinctions in the arcane corners of state law can impact whether a claimant’s
settlement is exempt. Many debtors do not receive bankruptcy-specific advice when
settling claims, and plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely not aware or mindful of the
potential implications until it is too late. Beyond accrual and exemption woes, the
claimant may face still more challenges if he did not previously disclose the claim in
his dormant bankruptcy. In that instance, mass tort defendants may argue that judicial
estoppel prevents the claimant from collecting a settlement in the first place. In all,
the layered doctrinal challenges relating to claim accrual, exemptions, and judicial
estoppel create a harrowing and often insurmountable path to recovery for tort
victims.
Powerful stakeholders like the trustee and claims administrator control the
process for evaluating a claimant’s settlement payment against this nuanced doctrinal
framework. The compensation structure for these stakeholders creates incentives that
magnify the settlement trap. Trustees are tasked with acting in the best interests of
the bankruptcy estate and its creditors,11 but in any given case the appropriate action
may fall along a spectrum of potential options. For example, a claim that will be fully
exempt is likely not worth the trustee’s time to litigate and should be abandoned.
However, a claim that could possibly return funds to the estate in excess of any
potential exemption may—or may not—be worth the trustee’s limited resources.
Whether or when a trustee seeks to reopen a bankruptcy case to collect a mass tort
settlement payment is a matter of discretion. So, too, is the decision to take an active
role in a debtor’s pending litigation, including negotiating the specifics of a
settlement.12 Keep in mind, though, that the often-substantial costs of pursuing a
claim or settlement, including trustee and counsel fees, will be paid out of the estate’s
assets before any recovery goes to creditors. Thus, the trustee will be paid first for
any efforts they expend to recover a claim, creating a perverse incentive to pursue
claims even if the benefit to creditors is minimal.

9. E.g., Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (noting one of
the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to “relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start fresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes”); see also ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY
WESTBROOK, KATHERINE PORTER & JOHN POTTOW, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS (7th
ed. 2014).
10. Individual states may also opt out of the federal exemptions altogether, leaving
debtors with no choice but to claim exemptions under state law. 11 U.S.C. § 522.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a).
12. This paper is particularly concerned with three types of discretionary trustee behavior:
pursuing settlements that are likely exempt, destroying the value of the debtor’s potential
surplus, and settling claims in ways that disqualify the resulting payment from exemptions.
These behaviors reflect structural tension between a debtor’s ability to claim settlement
proceeds via exemptions or surplus and the trustee’s power to control the estate’s legal claims.
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Claims administrators—the companies that are hired to evaluate and distribute
settlement payments in mass tort cases—contribute to the settlement trap by
withholding payment and requiring claimants to involve the trustee. Claims
administrators must make sure that they only pay settlements to the proper party,
otherwise they risk losing business or facing legal claims from mass tort defendants.
Where there is any uncertainty due to bankruptcy, claims administrators require
claimants to get some proof that they are entitled to the payment, such as a signed
statement from the trustee or an order from the bankruptcy court.13 Trustees therefore
learn about settlement payments more often in the mass tort context than they
otherwise would and are incentivized by the Code’s fee structure to argue that such
payments belong to the estate. The claims administrator and trustee can effectively
trap settlement payments until questions about accrual and exemptions are resolved,
either through settlement with the claimant or after contentious battles in court.
When asked about the settlement trap, stakeholders I interviewed all agreed
that the system was inefficient and problematic. They pointed to various causes and
contributing factors, from the “gang of lawyers” in mass tort cases who have too
much control in the process and not enough bankruptcy knowledge,14 to the claims
administrators that increase costs “out of the claimant’s pockets,”15 to the “moneygrabber” trustees who “shake down” claimants for their settlement awards.16 There
is plenty of blame to go around, but the problem remains unresolved. The settlement
trap is costly, time consuming, and acutely impacts individual claimants.
Disputes regarding the treatment of settlement payments in bankruptcy have
become more frequent over the past fifteen years, with a significant wave of cases in
the last five years in connection with the NFL and pelvic mesh MDLs.17 Mass tort
cases pose a number of challenges that make the effects of the settlement trap more
harmful and difficult to police.18 Yet scholars have largely ignored the problem.
Scholarship surrounding consumer bankruptcy exemptions and the treatment of

13. Telephone Interview with Claims Administrator (Oct. 1, 2019).
14. Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs’ Attorney 4 (Sept. 27, 2019).
15. Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs’ Attorney 2 (Sept. 28, 2019).
16. Telephone Interview with Debtors’ Attorney (Oct. 1, 2019).
17. Telephone Interview with Trustee 1 (Sept. 26, 2019). See generally Lawrence
Ponoroff, Neither ‘Twixt nor ‘Tween: Emerging Property Interests in Bankruptcy, 61 ARIZ. L.
REV. 101 (2018) (describing increase in mass tort cases in bankruptcy). I suspect this is true
for a few reasons. First, large mass tort settlement structures result in payments to many
claimants in a relatively short window of time, increasing the likelihood that payments will be
due to current or prior debtors. Additionally, mass tort injuries, such as CTE in the NFL cases,
may be debilitating enough to drive claimants and their families into bankruptcy. Further, mass
tort claims relating to defective products tend to have long latency periods, meaning many of
the claim accrual issues will be put at issue for long-dormant bankruptcies. Finally, and most
significantly, current mass tort claim forms almost always require the claimant to disclose
prior bankruptcies, leading to increased scrutiny of the issue.
18. See infra Part II.A.2. Representation in mass tort cases is more likely to be collective,
meaning attorneys tend to make decisions about litigation and settlement strategy without an
individual claimant’s bankruptcy exemptions in mind. Additionally, mass tort defendants are
motivated to undercut the litigation against them and may agree to settle cases on terms that
align with the trustee’s interest but harm the debtor. And finally, many mass tort claims relate
to latent harms that do not manifest for years. This delay opens the door for claimants to be
caught in the web of standards for claim accrual in bankruptcy.
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personal injury payments has thus far centered upon constitutional problems with
uniformity in state and federal exemptions,19 debtors’ strategic use of exemptions to
avoid paying judgments,20 and issues surrounding the lien-stripping provisions in §
522(f).21 This Article’s contribution is to identify the settlement trap and ways to
mitigate its harsh effects.
By interviewing stakeholders and collecting examples from the ongoing NFL
concussion and pelvic mesh cases, this Article uncovers vast discrepancies in how
bankruptcy trustees across the country approach mass tort settlements. This Article
also uncovers systemic challenges imposed by the claims administration process that
hinder claimants from receiving payments that would—or should, under rational
exercise of the parties’ discretion—go to claimants. This Article diagnoses the core
features of a settlement trap, including complex laws, lack of control, and prohibitive
costs. After identifying challenges posed by incomplete professional and fiduciary
duties, broad discretionary authority, and conflicting financial incentives, this Article
suggests a number of measures, both structural and procedural, that would mitigate
the most pernicious features of the settlement trap.
I.

TREATMENT OF SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY

Before introducing the settlement trap, it is first important to understand both the
basic operation of consumer bankruptcy law and the doctrinal issues behind the
problem. This Part sets the stage.
A. The Consumer Bankruptcy Process
An individual debtor begins her case by filing a bankruptcy petition, at which time
an estate is formed that contains all of the debtor’s “legal or equitable interests” in
property.22 As is relevant here, property of the estate includes litigation claims and
any settlements that result from such claims.23 The debtor, within certain
constraints,24 may elect to file under one of three different chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code. The vast majority of consumer debtors file either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13

19. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted
Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 353 (2014); Gary E. Sullivan, A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions, 2018
BYU L. REV. 335, 335 (2018) (creating a model for opt-out states to create “bankruptcyspecific exemptions”).
20. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603, 714 (2006) (explaining how bankruptcy law undermines the ability of tort claimants to
recover judgments).
21. See, e.g., Paulette J. Delk, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code: The Winding Road to the Supreme Court, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 879–83, 893
(1991) (recommending amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would harmonize tension
between the opt-out and lien avoidance provisions of section 522).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (forming an estate comprised of “all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).
23. See Parker v. Wendy's Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
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cases.25 In Chapter 7 cases, the bankruptcy process involves liquidating the debtor’s
nonexempt property, distributing available assets among creditors, and then
discharging the debtor’s remaining unpaid debts.26 Chapter 13 cases, by contrast,
require the debtor to complete a structured repayment plan over three to five years,
after which all estate property re-vests in the debtor, free from preexisting debt
obligations.27 In either instance, consumer bankruptcy seeks to achieve two goals:
promote the debtor’s “fresh start” in the world while still maximizing and equitably
distributing assets among creditors.
To obtain the benefits and protections of bankruptcy, the debtor must in turn
disclose many details about his assets and liabilities. This includes identifying
property that is exempt, meaning it will be removed from the bankruptcy estate and
returned to the debtor. As explained in more detail below, exemptions can originate
from state or federal law depending on where the debtor is domiciled.28 Exemptions
are designed to provide the debtor with enough property to get back on his feet and
prevent him from becoming reliant on the government or others for survival.
Procedurally, the debtor must outline his exemptions on Schedule C to the
bankruptcy petition. This document can be freely amended and so long as the case
remains open at the time the exemption is claimed the bankruptcy court should permit
it.29 Unless a party objects, the asset is presumed exempt. Any objector has the
burden to show that the property should not be exempt. Bankruptcy courts across the
country recognize a strong norm in favor of exemption and often interpret close cases
to allow a debtor to exempt the property.30 Even after a bankruptcy case is complete,
or “closed,” the court maintains limited jurisdiction over the debtor. For example, if
information comes to light that the debtor had additional, undisclosed assets, an
interested party may ask the court to reopen the bankruptcy case to administer the
property.31

25. The third option, filing under Chapter 11, is usually only selected by debtors who do
not want to lose their property in Chapter 7 but who have too many assets to qualify for Chapter
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (setting debt limits for Chapter 13 debtors).
26. This introductory explanation does not address many nuanced exceptions and
potential challenges that could arise in a debtor’s bankruptcy case.
27. See infra Section I.C.2.
28. See infra Part I.C.2. In short, federal exemptions permit a debtor to keep a limited
amount of a personal injury payment, while state exemptions range from allowing no
exemption whatsoever for personal injury payments to exempting all amounts that the debtor
reasonably needs to live his or her life. Depending on the specifics of the claims and the terms
of the settlement, mass tort awards may also fall within other exemptions, such as those for
lost wages or disability payments.
29. See In re Mendoza, 595 B.R. 849, 856–57 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2019) (holding that
debtors may freely amend schedules in reopened bankruptcy cases to list assets and claim
exemptions); In re Bronk, 444 B.R. 903 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2011) (observing that amendment
may be denied if there is evidence of the debtor’s bad faith and creditors would be prejudiced).
30. See In re Reschick, 343 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (“Given the public
policy behind exemptions in bankruptcy, it is of no surprise that the Bankruptcy Rules provide
that ‘the objecting party has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly
claimed’ by the debtor.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 19, at 341–42 (explaining the
bankruptcy-specific policy norms supporting exemptions and contrasting them with
motivations for state exemption regimes).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 5010.
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After all assets are collected and claims against the debtor identified, the available
funds are distributed to creditors.32 The distribution scheme outlined in the
Bankruptcy Code first removes exempt property and gives secured creditors the
value of their collateral.33 Next, administrative claims (including the trustee and
special counsel fees)34 and other priority unsecured claims are paid in full,35 then
unsecured creditors receive a pro rata distribution of available funds.36 Finally, if
every other claim is paid in full, any surplus goes to the debtor.37
B. Consumer Bankruptcy’s Cast of Characters
Bankruptcy cases involve many stakeholders that do not appear in civil litigation,
and each one plays an important role in the process Congress designed through the
Code. These stakeholders have different powers, responsibilities, and incentives that
impact the trajectory of a bankruptcy case. Understanding the various characters is a
critical step to understanding why the settlement trap has such a detrimental effect
on claimants.
Debtor: The debtor’s role requires little explanation. They initiate the bankruptcy
process to receive the benefits of bankruptcy and in return face significant oversight,
limitations, and scrutiny from other stakeholders.38 In Chapter 13 cases, the debtor
remains in control of estate assets during the course of the bankruptcy and has
standing to administer and resolve issues that come up with estate property. In
contrast, Chapter 7 debtors have no rights to or control over estate property. Debtors
are entitled to exempt certain property, and also receive any surplus from the estate
after all claims and administrative expenses are paid.39
Judge: Bankruptcy judges are the ultimate gatekeeper for the debtor’s path
through bankruptcy. These Article I judges have jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases
by reference from district courts,40 and hear and decide a broad range of issues due
to the bankruptcy court’s vast scope of authority.41 Bankruptcy judges exercise
significant discretion over many key issues, including (as is relevant here) whether
to reopen a previously closed bankruptcy case.42 The bankruptcy bench and bar are

32. The timing of this distribution will depend on what type of bankruptcy the debtor
filed.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 522.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
35. Id.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b).
37. Id. § 726(a).
38. In some instances, a debtor may be pushed into an involuntary bankruptcy if three
creditors so desire.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a); Schulman v. Cal. Water Res. Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R.
358, 366 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (observing that each district court is authorized to adopt
general order of reference for bankruptcy cases).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)–(c). The judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms by the
Circuit Court of Appeals.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b); see also In re Ross, 548 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016);
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relatively tight-knit groups, and the judge often plays a role in facilitating negotiation
and settlement among the parties to streamline contested issues and preserve estate
value.43 Judges also shape bankruptcy practice in their districts by communicating
expectations and setting boundaries of what will be accepted. Judges can
significantly impact how bankruptcy operates at a local level, especially on matters
involving discretionary action.
U.S. Trustee: The U.S. Trustee is appointed by statute to appear in every
bankruptcy case.44 Their role is to oversee administrative functions of the bankruptcy
process while ensuring that the debtor’s actions are consistent with the Bankruptcy
Code.45 The U.S. Trustee is an arm of the Department of Justice, and receives
guidance from the Executive Office of the United States Trustee on core issues of
bankruptcy practice and procedure.46 One of the U.S. Trustee’s jobs is to appoint and
oversee Chapter 7 and 13 trustees for consumer cases. The U.S. Trustee also has
standing to appear and be heard on issues within the bankruptcy case, including
whether to reopen a closed bankruptcy case for purposes of administering a
settlement payment.47
Trustee: Trustees serve different functions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. The
Chapter 7 trustee is tasked with administering the estate of a debtor and has full
control over liquidating assets, evaluating claims, and determining distributions. The
Chapter 7 trustee has significant discretion to pursue, or abandon,48 claims and
property for the benefit of the estate. It also is the sole party with standing to pursue
the debtor’s litigation claims and has authority to settle claims on behalf of the
estate.49 The Chapter 7 trustee is compensated via a fee structure outlined in the
Bankruptcy Code and often employs special counsel to assist with the legal aspects
of its role.50 Chapter 13 trustees, in contrast, do not control the estate’s assets. Instead
they serve in an oversight role, confirming that the debtor is acting in the best
interests of the estate and ensuring that the debtor proposes and completes a plan that

(noting the bankruptcy court’s “broad discretion to determine whether a party . . . has
demonstrated good cause” to reopen a case).
43. Although bankruptcy judges hear and decide many contested issues, they have a
fundamental awareness that the parties are in the best position to value their dispute and reach
a solution that preserves value. Stated another way, slash-and-burn bankruptcy litigation
consistently benefits attorneys, not the parties.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3). Alabama and North Carolina do not participate in the U.S.
Trustee program but have “bankruptcy administrators” that serve a near-identical function.
45. See Lindsey D. Simon, The Guardian Trustee in Bankruptcy Courts and Beyond, 98
N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2020) (explaining the various functions of the U.S. Trustee).
46. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., Significant Guidance Documents,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/significant-guidance-documents [https://perma.cc/L6W3-2C8F].
47. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 5010.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 544.
49. Id.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e). See Pamela Foohey, A New Deal for Debtors: Providing
Procedural Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2297, 2338–40 (2019)
(explaining the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 trustee compensation models and resulting
incentives).
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satisfies the Code requirements.51 Still, the Chapter 13 trustee has discretion to
impose requirements on the debtor and make determinations as to what repayment
terms are acceptable under the circumstances. Both categories of trustees are
integrally involved in consumer bankruptcy cases and the judge relies heavily on
their positions and arguments when evaluating a debtor’s case.52 The ways that
trustees exercise discretion will vary according to local legal culture, leading to
geographical differences in how they approach their role in consumer cases.53
Creditors (secured and unsecured): Creditors include any party to whom the
debtor owes an obligation as of the petition date. Creditors may be secured, meaning
their interest is protected by a security interest that gives them special rights in the
value of certain property, or unsecured.54 For creditors, the bankruptcy process
reflects the best-case procedural mechanism for a worst-case scenario. It is inherently
unjust that a debtor will not pay back 100% of the creditors’ debt. Without
bankruptcy’s strict protections, however, creditors, especially unsecured creditors,
would likely not receive an equal share of the debtor’s insufficient remaining assets.55
Plaintiffs’ attorney: While not technically a bankruptcy-specific party, plaintiffs’
attorneys will be involved in just about every bankruptcy case that results in a
settlement trap. When a debtor comes into bankruptcy with litigation claims, those
claims are usually being pursued by plaintiffs’ attorneys. These attorneys may or may
not be selected to continue pursuing the estate’s claim after the petition date.56 The
Chapter 7 trustee has authority to select attorneys to remain on the case as “special
counsel,” in which case any post-petition fees due to the plaintiffs’ attorney will be
classified as an administrative claim, meaning that they will be repaid before general
unsecured creditors.57

51. See John A. E. Pottow, Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy and Insolvency, LAW & ECON.
WORKING PAPERS, Mar. 29, 2018, at 1, 4–5 (discussing the role of Chapter 13 trustees).
52. This is not to say that the court is beholden to trustees or is likely to take their
arguments over those of the debtor; rather, they are a repeat stakeholder that the court will
consistently ask for input on important matters.
53. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Access to Consumer Bankruptcy, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEVS.
J. 341 (2018) (identifying the impact of local legal culture in consumer bankruptcies); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
25 (1998); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence
of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 804 (1994) (describing the impact of local legal culture in
bankruptcy).
54. See Pamela Foohey, Robert Lawless & Deborah Thorne, Driven to Bankruptcy, 55
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 298–303 (2020) (outlining the different categories and treatment
of creditors in consumer bankruptcy).
55. Instead, in a world without bankruptcy the debtor would pay off preferred creditors in
full while leaving nothing for other creditors.
56. Recall that, as of the petition date, the estate holds all litigation claims.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).

2021]

THE SETTLEMENT TRAP

671

C. Doctrinal Contours and Tension Points
Focusing once again on the bankruptcy treatment of settlement payments, the vast
majority of challenges relate to three doctrinal issues: (1) whether the settlement is
property of the estate based upon when it accrued, (2) whether the settlement is
exempt, and (3) whether the claimant is judicially estopped to recover the payment.
Procedurally, disputes over treatment of mass tort settlement payments generally
arise in one of several contexts, including: at a motion to reopen a closed bankruptcy
case to administer a settlement, in a trustee’s motion under Rule 9019 to seek
approval of a settlement, or on a party’s objection to the debtor’s claimed exemption.
Most often, the core of these disputes involves tension between the debtor and the
trustee.
1. Property of the Estate
When evaluating the bankruptcy treatment of settlement payments, the first step
is deciding whether the payment is property of the estate. Simply put, if the debtor’s
property included the claim at issue on the petition date, then it is property of the
estate.58 When the debtor receives settlement payments or files litigation claims
before filing a bankruptcy petition, there is little doubt that they are estate assets;
however, claims that are not yet known to the debtor when he files for bankruptcy
may still be estate property. The accrual analysis for whether litigation claims are
property of the estate varies by jurisdiction, but generally falls within one of three
approaches: (1) whether the debtor discovered, or should have discovered, the harm
as of the petition date; (2) whether all of the elements of the claim were present before
the petition date; or (3) whether the post-petition claim was “sufficiently rooted” to
the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy past such that it should be included as an asset of the
estate.59
Bankruptcy courts look to state law on accrual to determine whether an asset is
property of the estate.60 Differences in state-accrual methods are especially apparent
in the mass-tort context, where latent injury is a frequent issue.61 Many states
incorporate a permissive, discovery-based framework that evaluates whether, at the
time of the bankruptcy petition (or during the pendency of the bankruptcy if in a

58. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
59. See Nicole Pellerin, Undisclosed Claims and Causes of Action, 2016 AM. BANKR. TR.
J., 32, 33–34 (describing different accrual considerations); see also In re Ross, 548 B.R. 632
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying the elements approach and determining that medical device
claim was not property of the estate).
60. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979); Cusano v. Klein (In re
Cusano), 264 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2001). Most states do not have a bankruptcy-specific accrual
scheme, but instead look to state law on accrual for purposes of statutes of repose and
limitation. See, e.g., In re Purcell, 573 B.R. 859, 867 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017) (applying Kansas
non-bankruptcy statute of limitations to accrual issue). State legislatures set such time periods
for purposes of barring claims, not impacting exemptions.
61. See Ponoroff, supra note 12 (discussing accrual standards).
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Chapter 13 case),62 the debtor knew, or should have known, of his claim.63 This
accrual method prevents debtors who had no reason to know they had been injured,
or had a claim for the injury, from having their settlement dragged back into
bankruptcy.
On the other end of the spectrum, courts in product-based cases look to when the
defective item left the factory or when it first made contact with the debtor.64 These
approaches may reflect state law preferences on limiting expansive statutes of repose
or limitation; however, their impact when imported into bankruptcy’s “asset of the
estate” determination is striking. One bankruptcy judge considered the practical
result of prepetition-exposure standards, concluding that:
[s]uch analysis would expand property of the estate to include any
interest so long as a trustee can tie such interest to a debtor’s “prebankruptcy past” and would transform section 341 meetings of creditors
into health examinations. Opportunistic trustees would be scrambling to
latch onto every possible claim that may someday arise, however
attenuated.65
Trustees in exposure-based accrual states embrace the ease of administration that
comes from clear prepetition-exposure standards, observing that they do not waste
estate assets arguing with debtors about whether settlements are property of the
estate.66 That may be correct, but administrative ease cannot be the deciding factor,
especially where the substantive impact is dragging claimants with no prepetition
knowledge of their injury into the settlement trap.
A majority of circuits consider a different, federally created standard in addition
to (or instead of)67 state law accrual standards.68 These courts ask whether the claim
was “sufficiently rooted in the [debtor’s] pre-bankruptcy past.”69 True to form, courts
have interpreted this standard to mean different things in different contexts, 70 further
complicating the doctrine.

62. Interestingly, if a debtor converts her case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, any postpetition claims that would have been an asset of the Chapter 13 estate revert back to the debtor.
See In re Love, No. 15-34977-KRH, 2019 WL 2427198, at *2, *2 n.16 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June
10, 2019) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(f)(1)(A), 1306(a)).
63. See In re Purcell, 573 B.R. 859, 867 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017) (applying a discovery
test).
64. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 586 B.R. 775, 782–90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2018) (determining
that the implantation of the debtor’s pelvic mesh was the relevant time for accrual purposes);
In re Davis, No. 10-24836-JRS, 2018 WL 2223076 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 15, 2018) (same).
65. In re Ross, 548 B.R. 632, 640–41 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016).
66. Curiously, none of the trustees mentioned the financial upside of their state’s
interpretation: more assets to administer results in more fees to the trustee. See infra Section
II.C.2.
67. See In re Richards, 249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
68. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379–81 (1966).
69. Id. at 380.
70. See, e.g., In re Harber, 553 B.R. 522, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2016) (asking whether a
substantial portion of the claim accrued prepetition such that it would be inequitable to keep
the asset from creditors); Underhill v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Underhill), 579 Fed.
App’x. 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2014) (concluding that without prepetition injury, the claim could
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Ironing out the accrual standards in each state for each type of claim is beyond
the scope of this Article, and any effort to paint a nationwide picture would be
outdated just as quickly as it were published.71 Whatever the standards may be,
debtors with settlement payments—and the trustees/creditors seeking to collect or
distribute them—will need to understand the law. A court’s determination about
whether a settlement payment is an asset of the estate has real consequences. If
settlement payments are outside the estate, then the debtor can escape bankruptcyimposed administrative costs and potentially lengthy litigation about whether the
settlement is exempt. Additionally, if the bankruptcy remains open while the
litigation claim is pending, then a decision that the claim belongs to the estate divests
the debtor of standing to pursue it and opens the door to the trustee’s discretionary
resolution of the claim.72 As this Section illustrates, identical debtors may experience
starkly different experiences across state lines.
2. Exemptions
The bankruptcy estate, though vast, does not include every asset the debtor owns
as of the petition date. Recognizing the debtor’s need to survive after bankruptcy,
current law permits the debtor to keep, or “exempt,” certain types of property.73
While simple in theory, the exemption doctrine is extremely complicated to apply.
This Section introduces bankruptcy exemptions, outlines their origin and purpose,
and explains the process for evaluating and claiming exemptions.
The Bankruptcy Code exempts certain of the debtor’s settlement payments from
collection, reflecting a public policy that promotes a “fresh start” after bankruptcy.74
However, vast differences among each state’s exemption standards create
uncertainty that even experienced bankruptcy professionals struggle to unravel.
Deciding which payments are exempt from the bankruptcy trustee’s grasp can turn
on what may seem like inconsequential characteristics and details of a settlement.75

not be sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s prepetition life); Mueller v. Hall (In re Parker), No.
06–8053, 2007 WL 1376081, at *7–8 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (framing the analysis as whether
there is a strong nexus between the action and pre-bankruptcy events).
71. Additionally, it is the stuff of nightmares for research assistants or first-year
associates.
72. See Fair v. Biogen Idec Inc., No. 11-1509, slip op. at 12–16 (Mass. Super. Ct. June
12, 2012). As described in Section II.C.2, trustees have both incentive and opportunity to settle
claims in ways that eliminate the debtor’s opportunity to claim an exemption.
73. See Sullivan, supra note 19 at 337–38.
74. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets
on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235
(1995) (“A central feature of American consumer bankruptcy law is the ‘fresh start’ policy,
which, through the dual mechanisms of discharge and exemption, affords debtors a certain
degree of economic viability in exchange for the surrender of present assets at filing.”).
75. See Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of
Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31
RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 621 (1978) (noting that exemptions are designed “(1) [t]o provide the
debtor with property necessary for . . . survival; (2) [t]o protect the dignity and the cultural and
religious identity of the debtor; (3) [t]o enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself [or herself]
financially and earn income in the future; (4) [t]o protect the debtor's family from the adverse
consequences of impoverishment; [and] (5) [t]o shift the burden of providing the debtor and
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Both state and federal interests are implicated by exemption law, and there are
parallel doctrinal frameworks both in and outside of bankruptcy. The Code’s
exemption provisions are designed with the realities of insolvency in mind. The
benefits of the fresh start from the federal perspective are widespread, from the
debtor (who is enabled to maintain his dignity) to the broader society (which will not
have to bear the burden of the debtor’s financial woes).76 State-level incentives for
exemption law are slightly different, as they were not created with bankruptcy in
mind. Instead, state exemption standards are intended to address debtor-creditor
relationships and create some basic floor to a creditor’s collection efforts, regardless
of a debtor’s insolvency.77 Given the different policy perspectives at the state and
federal levels, Congress encountered significant conflicts when deciding how the
bankruptcy exemption scheme should relate to existing state law.78 When drafting
the modern bankruptcy code in the early 1970s, Congress appointed a commission
of bankruptcy experts to provide guidance on a number of issues.79 Regarding optout provisions and state exemptions, the commission recommended imposing
uniform federal exemptions.80 After heated political debate, Congress went against
the recommendations and included both state and federal exemption options in the
legislation, at the preference and discretion of each state.81
To identify whether certain assets are exempt, the debtor must know which
exemptions apply. Because Congress permitted the state opt-out provision in section
522, not all debtors will be eligible to use the federal exemptions. The Bankruptcy
Code imposes a domicile rule on section 522, which requires debtors to use the
exemptions of the state where the debtor was domiciled for the 730 days prior to the
petition date.82 If the debtor was domiciled in more than one state during that
window, then the debtor takes the exemptions of the state where he lived during the
180 days prior to the 730-day period.83 While the choice-of-law analysis generally
maps on to the state where the debtor is eligible to file for bankruptcy (i.e., the forum
state), the rights to exemption are personal, not geographic, and move with the
debtor.84 Once the debtor knows which state’s exemption laws apply, she can
evaluate what options there may be for specific property.

his family with minimal financial support from society to the debtor's creditors”).
76. See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 341–45 (describing the policy implications of federal
exemptions).
77. See generally Ponoroff, supra note 14, at 356–60 (describing tension between
exemption incentives at the state and federal level).
78. See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 343–45.
79. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970).
80. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 170–74 (1973). See also Stephen G. Gilles, The
Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 624–25 n.84 (2006) (describing the
opt-out regime).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). Exemptions have long been a critical element of consumer
bankruptcy and one that is consistently under review and analysis. See Charles J. Tabb, The
Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 9, 13–14
(2007) (listing exemption issues as important in history).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
83. Id. But see In re Pederson, 105 B.R. 622, 624–25 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (applying—
prior to institution of the Bankruptcy Code’s domicile rule—Colorado choice of law rules to
determine that Colorado law should apply and not the underlying litigation forum state).
84. See Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws”, 42 SETON HALL
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As explained above, exemptions may originate at the state or federal level. The
applicable law will outline the category of property that may be exempt and any
conditions for eligibility (such as mandatory characteristics of property, use, or
value).85 In many instances, exemptions are not an all-or-nothing proposition. Where
the Bankruptcy Code identifies exempt property on a per item basis—for example,
the exemption for an automobile found in section 522(d)(2)—and the property falls
within the dollar limitation, then the debtor may keep that property.86 A valuation
analysis of the property is completed as of the petition date; if the property increases
in value during the bankruptcy case, then the upside goes to the debtor.87 If, however,
the value of the asset exceeds the threshold, then the asset is not fully exempt.88 The
Chapter 7 trustee is the sole party with standing to administer the asset, and the debtor
will receive the value of the exemption (with excess value going to the estate).89 In
the event of a valuation dispute, the challenger has the burden to prove that the asset’s
valuation exceeds the exemption amount.90 Some jurisdictions permit a debtor to
layer or “stack” available exemptions up to the amount of the asset, while others
require a debtor to elect an exemption and collect only that portion.91
Settlement payments may qualify under multiple exemptions. Relevant
exemptions for mass tort settlements under federal law include exemptions for
personal injury,92 loss of wages,93 disability benefits,94 and the “wildcard”
exemption, which may be applied to any property.95 Whether a settlement payment

L. REV. 1081, 1094–96 (2012) (outlining the choice-of-law issue). The vast majority of
scholarship and litigation surrounding choice-of-law issues relates to homestead exemptions,
which vary greatly by state. This is, in part, due to the visibility and public condemnation of
debtors purchasing million-dollar estates on the eve of bankruptcy and then exempting them,
thwarting creditors.
85. See generally Sullivan, supra note 19 at 356–58 (describing different states’
limitations on property exemptions).
86. See, e.g., id. at 337 n.2 (explaining the operation of a motor vehicle exemption in
different dollar-value scenarios).
87. See, e.g., Polis v. Getaways, Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting the possibility that assets appreciate over the course of the bankruptcy).
88. See Ponoroff, supra note 19 at 362 n.46.
89. See William T. Clarke, A Bankruptcy Primer for Personal Injury Lawyers, S.C. LAW.
30, 31 (2007) (describing a scenario in which a debtor’s asset is sold with amounts in excess
of a state exemption being returned to the estate). In Chapter 13 cases, the debtor remains in
possession of estate assets that revest in the debtor when the payment plan is finalized, though,
in some jurisdictions, the Chapter 13 trustee may take an interest in pending litigation and ask
the court for additional assistance or oversight authority. Id. at 31, 33.
90. In re Polis, 217 F.3d at 904 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(c)).
91. See Uriel Rabinovitz, Note, Toward Effective Implementation of 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(11)(E): Invigorating a Powerful Bankruptcy Exemption, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1551–52 (2009) (explaining exemption stacking in the settlement payment context).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D).
93. Id. § 522(d)(11)(E); see also Rabinovitz, supra note 90, at 1523 (explaining the
possibility that mass tort payments may fall within the “lost wages” exemption depending
upon how they are structured).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C).
95. Id. § 522(d)(5) (permitting a debtor to exempt up to $1325, in addition to any amount
up to $12,575 of the $25,150 homestead exemption that remains unused, in any type of
property).
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falls within any of these exemptions will turn on the facts of the case and the forum
law governing their application. While federal exemptions are uniform, they are not
uniformly applied; there is significant ambiguity regarding specific applications.96
State law exemptions relating to mass tort settlement payments fall along a wide
spectrum.97 Some states permit a debtor to retain any amount, while others offer no
exemption.98 State law may provide a set of exemptions for civil litigation that are
different from bankruptcy-specific exemptions, and the debtor may be in a position
to elect between the exemptions.99 Most states permit a debtor’s stake in ongoing
litigation to be exempted if it falls within an available category,100 but others require
a settlement to be finalized, or liquidated, before the petition date to qualify for an
exemption.101 Finally, there may be instances where part of the settlement is exempt
but the remaining portion is not. For example, in a state where pain and suffering
may be exempt but payments for future wages are not, the settlement agreement
could identify which part of the settlement falls into which category. When
settlement agreements do not identify the source or a purpose for the payment, the
court will be asked to decide which portion is eligible for exemption. The law is
divided on which party bears the burden to show how the settlement payment is
allocated.102
3. Estoppel
Another doctrinal challenge involving settlement payments is judicial estoppel,
an equitable doctrine that prevents litigants from taking inconsistent positions in
subsequent litigation. This arises in the bankruptcy context when a debtor fails to list
a cause of action (or potential cause of action) on her mandatory disclosures and

96. See Rabinovitz, supra note 90, at 1541–43.
97. See WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III & NANCY FRAAS
MACLEAN, BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION MANUAL app. B (West ed. 2020) (outlining treatment of
settlement payments under state law); Joseph J. Blyskal, III, Comment, Levying Flesh and
Charging Society, Creditors, and Insurance Companies for It: The Irony of Including Personal
Injury Awards in the Bankruptcy Estate, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 677, 701–05 (2007)
(discussing states’ approaches to exempting personal injury settlements).
98. See Sullivan, supra note 19 at 338 (comparing the available exemptions in different
states); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-504(b)(2) (2014); Cerny v. Salter, 429 S.E.2d
809 (1993) (confirming the unlimited cap to exempt settlement payments under South
Carolina’s exemption statute).
99. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451 (through 2020 Public Act 149) (outlining
bankruptcy-specific exemptions), with id. § 600.6023 (providing non-bankruptcy collection
exemptions).
100. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-17 (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1563.02
(LexisNexis 2019).
101. In re Key, 255 B.R. 217, 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1010 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000)
(concluding that Nebraska’s personal injury exemption, Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-1563.02,
was not available for unliquidated claims).
102. See, e.g., In re Meyer, 433 B.R. 739, 744–46 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (placing the
burden on the trustee to show, by the preponderance of the evidence, that an exemption is not
validly claimed, and concluding that an entire payment could be exempt despite not having
clear apportionment between pain and suffering and future earnings).
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receives a discharge.103 Defendants in later proceedings argue that the claimant’s
omission operates as a statement in her bankruptcy that no such claim existed and,
as a result, the claimant cannot later sue the defendant.104 Judicial estoppel may apply
to bar the debtor’s claim105 where (1) a party’s position is clearly inconsistent with a
previous one, (2) the court accepted the previous position, and (3) the non-disclosure
was not inadvertent.106 Whether or how these standards are met varies significantly
in different parts of the country. In a mass tort case, the choice-of-law analysis for
judicial estoppel is a matter of federal common law that looks to where the mass
litigation (and not the bankruptcy case) is pending.107
The first two elements are easily established when the debtor received a discharge
without disclosing the claim on her petition.108 The bankruptcy court’s grant of a
discharge necessarily relies on full disclosure of all assets,109 and the debtor’s failure
to list the claim is akin to a statement that no such claim exists. On the inadvertence
requirement, multiple circuits have permitted an inference of bad faith where the
debtor knew about the claim and had motive to conceal it, concluding that a debtor
always has motive to conceal a settlement.110 Thus, a debtor may only argue
inadvertence if he had no knowledge of the claim. In other circuits, the debtor may
amend his schedules freely to avoid judicial estoppel.111 These courts conclude that,
by giving the trustee an opportunity to administer the estate, the underlying purpose
of disclosure in bankruptcy is met and the defendant would receive a windfall if
judicial estoppel were imposed.112

103. See, e.g., Fair v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., No. 11-1509, 2012 WL 2417722 (Mass. Super.
June 13, 2012). The Bankruptcy Code only discharges claims of the debtor that were disclosed.
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). Note that standards for judicial estoppel may vary between Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 cases, where the timeline for disclosure and discharge are significantly
different. See Byrd v. Wyeth, 907 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
104. I find it somewhat ironic that judicial estoppel in bankruptcy comes from a desire to
support the finality of confirmation orders, but the same logic does not prevent trustees from
reopening cases that were long resolved to administer previously unknown assets after the
debtor relied on the finality of confirmation.
105. The trustee, however, is not barred by judicial estoppel because it was not the party
who made conflicting representations. See, e.g., Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268,
1271–72 (11th Cir. 2004).
106. See Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012).
107. See In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 16-2740, 2018 WL 5016219,
at *2–3 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2018) (applying Fifth Circuit law on judicial estoppel to a debtor
who filed for Chapter 7 in Ohio because the MDL transferee court for the underlying claim
was in the Fifth Circuit).
108. Some courts have even found reliance where the bankruptcy remains open. See, e.g.,
Love, 677 F.3d 258.
109. See Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008)
(discussing the impact of a debtor’s failure to disclose assets).
110. See Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1157–59 (10th Cir. 2007);
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Coastal
Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th Cir. 1999)); Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289,
1294–98 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 210; Ryan Operations G.P. v.
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362–63 (3d Cir. 1996).
111. See Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004).
112. See id. at 1113 n.3; see also Cannata v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d
1165, 1175–76 (D. Nev. 2011) (rejecting judicial estoppel but creating equitable limitation on
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II. THE SETTLEMENT TRAP IN MASS TORT CASES
Bankruptcy’s treatment of settlements is imprecise and imperfect. This Part
contextualizes the bankruptcy-specific challenges in one particularly troubling
environment: mass tort cases. By using mass tort cases as an example, this Part
introduces the paradigmatic settlement trap. It identifies three core characteristics of
a settlement trap, and then explores the underlying forces that cause the trap to form.
A. Bankruptcy’s Collision Course with the Mass Tort System
Consumer debtors have litigation assets in all forms, and many of the same
characters (exercising the same discretion) will be asked to administer diverse claims
relating to business disputes, car accident injuries, and family law issues. Why, then,
does this Article focus on mass tort claims? This Section explores why mass tort
cases pose a particularly severe settlement trap and explains why they also offer a
useful forum to identify challenges and implement solutions.
1. Additional Characters
Mass tort cases introduce additional stakeholders to a consumer bankruptcy
litigation scenario. Understanding the different role of these participants will help
shape the ultimate prescription.
Aggregate-litigation counsel: In addition to individual plaintiffs’ attorneys,
claimants in aggregate litigation cases will also be “represented” by a lead group of
lawyers who act, formally or informally, on behalf of all claimants. This may take
the form of class counsel in class actions, the “plaintiff’s steering committee” in
MDLs, or other ad hoc committees. Whether the case involves a class action, which
is binding on all claimants, or other aggregation device, which collects cases but
preserves their individual status, most settlements arise out of the aggregate-litigation
counsel’s negotiations with defendants.113 Additionally, assuming the defendants
agree to settle, the aggregate litigation counsel is also closely involved with the
defendants in defining the terms and conditions of the claim distribution program.114
Mass tort defendants: Every litigation claim involves at least one defendant;
however, mass tort defendants are different from defendants facing individual
plaintiffs because they negotiate and think of cases on a global scale. For example,
due to the number of potential claims at issue, a mass tort defendant may desire
settlements to have certain characteristics, such as allocation of settlement proceeds
to exclude pain and suffering, inclusion of mandatory no-fault releases, and other

the debtor’s ability to recover).
113. To be effective, such agreements outside of the class action context will require buyin from the individual claimants and their attorneys.
114. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1373–78 (2005) (noting that some settlement programs are formed
through consensus-building efforts with stakeholders).
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terms.115 Mass tort defendants may be incentivized by different issues in different
contexts but overall tend to take positions on timing, valuation, and closure.116 Given
their role in structuring settlement programs, mass tort defendants set the rules by
which claimants are eligible for relief.
Claims administrator: Claims administrators are the gatekeepers for settlement
payments. They oversee administration of the settlement program according to
program terms negotiated by the parties. Claims administrators advise the parties on
important terms to include, and their current practice is to request information about
a claimant’s bankruptcy history. When a claimant has a potential bankruptcy issue,
claims administrators evaluate whether the settlement may be property of the estate.
To do so, they do not conduct a state-specific analysis; rather, they take a
conservative view of what could possibly be an estate asset.117 If a claim is potentially
impacted by bankruptcy, the claims administrator puts the funds aside in a separate
bank account and will not release them until the claimant or another party provides
proof of who may receive the payment and (critical to mass tort defendants) who has
the authority to release the claim.118 The consequences of mistakenly paying the
wrong party are significant. The claims administration business is extremely
competitive, and incorrectly distributing funds without an effective release for the
defendant is a surefire way to fall behind competitors for future engagements, not to
mention any indemnification obligations owed to the mass tort defendants.
Litigation finance companies: Finally, mass tort claimants and their plaintiffs’
attorneys may turn to litigation finance companies to sustain themselves while
waiting for a settlement payment.119 The presence of litigation finance may impact
settlement negotiations and have a broader impact on the litigation system. Litigation
finance companies also have an interest in whether the claimant’s payment is

115. See Claims Administrator, supra note 13 (describing different terms defendants have
crafted in settlement documents). See also D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL
Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2179–82 (2017) (outlining defendant-driven elements
in MDL settlements). Mass tort defendants can take advantage of the exemption scheme by
overvaluing the claim above an exemption cap so that the trustee—and not the claimant—has
control over the litigation. While the claimant might be motivated to reject the settlement to
pursue his claims, the trustee is more likely to settle.
116. “Some mass tort defendants are happy to pay more money to delay the process, while
others want it to be streamlined to reduce the overall costs.” Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note
6.
117. The claims administrators do not evaluate whether exemptions could apply.
118. Claims Administrator, supra note 13. In class action cases, where releases are
mandatory on a class-wide basis, this concern is less pressing, and settlement programs are
usually more permissive on when to release bankruptcy-impacted claims.
119. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1313 (2012) (describing the role of litigation finance companies in
aggregated consumer cases); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, White Paper on Alternative
Litigation Finance, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBH8-CP3H]; Byron G. Stier, The Sale and Settlement of Mass Tort
Claims: Alternative Litigation Finance and a Possible Future of Mass Tort Resolution, 23
WIDENER L.J. 193 (2013) (describing mass tort litigation finance).
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property of the bankruptcy estate; if so, the company can usually only recover to the
extent the claimant has rights to an exemption or surplus.
2. Complicating Factors
The mass tort industry presents a number of factors that fuel the settlement trap.
Practically, mass tort cases are relevant because they are a likely catalyst for the
development of bankruptcy law in this area. Stated another way, many of the most
recent doctrinal challenges described above arose out of claims in mass tort cases.
There are a number of reasons why this is the case. First, mass tort claims commonly
involve latent injuries, which increases the likelihood that a debtor would have filed
for bankruptcy after the seeds of the claim were planted but long before the injury
lawsuit was filed (i.e., the facts often lead to accrual challenges that impact the
“property of the estate” determination). Second, the sheer number of mass tort
claimants and the potentially disabling impact of mass tort injuries both suggest a
high volume of claimants with bankruptcy issues. As described above, those issues
would play out under different states’ laws across the country, leading to confusion.
Finally, and most importantly, many mass tort cases impose a bankruptcy notice
regime that requires claimants to disclose information about any previous
bankruptcies in their claim form.120 By collecting this information and requiring
claimants with a history of bankruptcy to take additional steps for payment, the mass
tort process redirects significantly more settlements to the bankruptcy court for
trustee approval.
Mass tort cases also have complicating characteristics that impact claimants. First,
the representational structure in many mass tort cases is so distant that it’s hard to
imagine any decisions being made with potential bankruptcy implications in
mind.121 Second, repeat players dominate the mass tort industry, and commentators
identify significant concerns about fee-seeking behavior by the various
stakeholders.122 Third, mass tort cases are often linked with litigation finance

120. See, e.g., NFL Concussion Settlement Claim Form for Retired NFL Football Players
and Representative Claimants, NFL CONCUSSION SETTLEMENT 10 (requesting information
about any previous bankruptcy cases), https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Docs/Claim
_Form_for_Retired_NFL_n_Representative_Claimants.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LL3-6T65].
The pelvic mesh MDL also contains a bankruptcy disclosure requirement. Curiously, non-tort
aggregate litigation cases—such as securities class actions—have not adapted a pattern of
requiring bankruptcy disclosures, despite the fact that settlement awards may be significant
and could be administered by the trustee just as the mass tort settlements described in this
paper. See, e.g., Proof of Claim and Release Form, CLOVIS SEC. LITIG.,
https://www.clovissecuritieslitigation.com/Content/Documents/Claim%20Form.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8DC8-AUZT].
121. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 529
(describing the lack of individualized representation in aggregate litigation); see also Linda S.
Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 511, 511 (2013) (describing representational challenges in various forms of aggregate
litigation); Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3167 (2013) (identifying the “agency problem” in aggregate
representation).
122. See ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN
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companies, which give claimants access to much-needed funding while they wait for
an award. These companies become creditors that have a vested interest in the
outcome of the claimant’s effort to recover payment, and that interest is intensified
when the payment is within the grasp of a bankruptcy trustee. Litigation finance
creditors may push to resolve whether a claimant’s settlement payment will be
captured and administered by the trustee, as the determination will impact the
creditor’s ability to recover from the claimant.123
For these and other reasons, mass tort cases are particularly complicated and
impose additional structural barriers for claimants. Making changes that improve the
settlement trap in mass tort cases will also improve, or create a roadmap to improve,
similar challenges in nonaggregate litigation.
3. Tales from the Litigation Trenches
I had one client who called up and said he got an award for $1.5 million
net, and the trustee won’t budge on giving the debtor just $200 thousand.
I didn’t know how to help him any longer, but it really stuck with me.
This one left me scratching my head: Gentleman has been on disability
and struggling for probably three decades. He was involved with a
bankruptcy about two decades ago that was closed around 2005. He gets
involved in the CTE case years after the closed bankruptcy and pleads
that he couldn’t know about his injury until now because the NFL failed
to disclose anything about the diseases. I’m not a bankruptcy person, but
I find it hard to believe that this poor guy has to reopen a bankruptcy,
from 15 years ago, and ask around if anybody has any entitlement to his
money.124
In this Section, and throughout the Article, I quote from dozens of interviews I
conducted with prominent stakeholders in bankruptcy and mass tort cases. I began
with a list of mass tort attorneys involved in the NFL CTE MDL, prominent trustees,
and bankruptcy attorneys who have represented clients in cases creating precedent

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (Cambridge 2019) (explaining the insular relationships and
conflicted decision-making in MDL negotiations); Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as
Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 863–
64 (2016) (identifying systemic challenges of aggregate litigation); David M. Jaros & Adam
S. Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 545, 557–62 (2017)
(describing incentive problems in the aggregate settlement process); Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Publicly Funded Objectors, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 51 (2018) (noting the
inability of the adversary system to highlight “scurrilous behavior” in class settlements due to
the shared incentives on all sides to pursue approval); Thomas D. Morgan, Client
Representation vs. Case Administration: The ALI Looks at Legal Ethics Issues in Aggregate
Settlements, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734, 741 (2011) (“The only people with a powerful bias
toward particularized representation, in short, are the clients whose interests the law purports
to protect. The risk is that, when lawyers and judges make the rules, clients will tend not to
have their interests heard.”).
123. One plaintiff’s attorney disclosed that many clients cannot receive litigation funding
due to the shadow of bankruptcy. Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note 6.
124. Plaintiffs’ Attorney 4, supra note 14.
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on these issues. Interviewees then provided recommendations for additional contacts
who had encountered the “bankruptcy issue” in mass tort cases. I created a list of
questions that I asked each interviewee and saved my written notes from each
conversation.125 You will no doubt observe that names are not included for these
individuals. I asked each person whether I could quote them, either anonymously or
by name. A significant number would speak with me on background only, and those
willing to be quoted insisted on anonymity. They explained that both the mass torts
and bankruptcy communities are small and insular, and attorneys rely heavily on
repeat engagements. The fear of retaliation, both against the attorney and their client,
was palpable. As one attorney explained, “I have to work with these people; I have
to help my clients. I can’t have anything out there that would let them identify me.”
These stories bring to light the great injustice of the settlement trap.
Mass tort claimants are acutely impacted by the nuances of bankruptcy law and
the way it treats settlement payments. A large part of the problem relates to lack of
information and awareness, both for claimants and their attorneys. “I assure you that
most practitioners have no idea of the bankruptcy implications of their settlements,”
said one experienced mass torts attorney.126 As another plaintiffs’ attorney explained,
dealing with bankruptcy issues in mass tort cases is like “the law of two worlds that
don’t fit together colliding.”127 A Chapter 7 trustee gave an example of the potential
risk of making mistakes in this complicated area: “I had one case where a plaintiffs’
attorney misunderstood the [exemption] statute, thought a $10,000 exemption limit
for personal bodily harm would apply to pain and suffering and made a point to
allocate the settlement to get an exemption. Because they were wrong, debtor was
left in the middle with nothing.”128
Attorneys shared a sense of helplessness surrounding how and why bankruptcy
law stands between their client and relief. One attorney who has more than eighty
clients still waiting for payments explained his frustration as follows: “The nature of
a mass tort is that you have clients in many jurisdictions. The people in [State A], I
can advise them and counsel them on [bankruptcy settlement issues], but normally
in a different jurisdiction I have to send them for help from others.”129 The frustration
is particularly acute in cases where the bankruptcy was closed long ago. Claims
administrators bear the brunt of this frustration. “We are usually met with resistance,
consternation and complaining. Nobody knows and understands it. In closed cases,
we get lots of pushback saying ‘it’s closed, why do we gotta worry about it now?’”130
Even some trustees recognize the potential for absurdity when administering ancient
claims: “Do you really think, nineteen years later that anybody is going to file a

125. After I provided a detailed summary, the University of Georgia confirmed that this
project was exempt from Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in
Research (IRB) review based upon Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 46, on March 8, 1983,
and amended in the Federal Register, 56 Fed. Reg. 28001, on June 18, 1991.
126. Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note 6.
127. Plaintiffs’ Attorney 2, supra note 15.
128. Trustee 1, supra note 17.
129. Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs’ Attorney 3 (Sept. 26, 2019).
130. Claims Administrator, supra note 13.
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claim?,” said one Chapter 7 trustee.131 “I’d set the bar date and see if any claims are
filed. If not, just let it go.”132
Attorneys and trustees also described the administrative hassle they face to
convince claims administrators to release payments.
Millions and millions of dollars sit there, until what? In theory the court
is supervising it. In actual fact, ten years after it’s opened, the fund
administrator submits a report and says we did X, Y, Z, and we’re not
sure what they do with the undecideds. There are just lots of bankruptcies
where the claims administrator wouldn’t pay it out.133
As another mass torts lawyer explained, “[m]ore and more administrators hold up
money than they used to . . . . [T]he whole process has become so much more
legalistically complicated, they have a contract that requires them to jump through
eighty-two hoops instead of just getting something done.”134 For their part, claims
administrators acknowledged the challenge that claimants face when trying to satisfy
the various programs’ standards for release. “The programs vary as to how aggressive
they want us to be about cleaning this stuff up . . . in individual voluntary programs,
people worry about it more because there isn’t a [class-wide] release and they want
to make sure it’s the right person.” Attorneys were particularly offended by how
quickly the settlement payment was consumed with fees imposed by the process to
release payment. “Everything comes out of the claimant’s hide, it comes out after the
fact, and there’s so much money tied up that there is no efficient way to pursue
this.”135
Many plaintiffs’ and debtors’ attorneys shared stories about clients that were
caught within the settlement trap. One NFL player’s experience stood out, from
beginning to end, as a cautionary tale of the worst a claimant may endure. The player
filed for bankruptcy in the early 2000s as the result of a significant judgment debt.
Nearly twelve years after the bankruptcy case concluded, the player filed a claim
under the NFL settlement program. After the player disclosed the bankruptcy on his
claim form, the claims administrator notified the player that he needed to inform the
trustee about the claim. The trustee filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case and
filed an adversary proceeding—a bankruptcy “case within a case”—seeking the
court’s determination that any settlement payment was an asset of the estate. The
player is still challenging that argument, as he was on an NFL team both before and
after the bankruptcy case closed, and applicable state law is not certain. Given the
imprecise diagnostic process for CTE and the complex nature of brain injuries, it is
impossible to determine whether the player’s injury related to a single incident or a
cumulative injury over a period of years. Assuming the bankruptcy court finds that
the claim is estate property, the player’s attorney will amend the claimed exemptions
from state to federal to obtain a determination that the payment is exempt as a
disability payment (the player has serious quality of life challenges).

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Trustee 1, supra note 17.
Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note 6.
Plaintiffs’ Attorney 2, supra note 15.
Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note 6.
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The trustee hired counsel, who represented the trustee on a contingency basis.
“Basically,” said the player’s bankruptcy attorney, “counsel is going to take onethird of whatever the trustee recovers. And, again, my client hasn’t recovered
anything.”136 The attorney recalls a crushing exchange where the trustee threatened
to pursue potential cost of appellate fees if the claimant continued to challenge
whether the payment belonged to the estate. “Well,” the trustee said,
you would probably win in the bankruptcy court, because I don’t think
the judge would rule in our favor. And you would probably be affirmed
at the District Court level. But if we take it to the [Court of Appeals],
depending on the panel, you will probably lose, and your client would
owe all the fees.137
According to the attorney, it was a “complete shakedown” by a “money-grabber”
trustee who has a pattern of similar behavior in the district.138
One claims administrator estimated that 5–10% of all claims in a case will be
flagged for bankruptcy hold and the connected payment segmented in a bank account
pending resolution. In the NFL settlement program, for example, current statistics
show that 2721 claimants are eligible for payments that total $1.65 billion.139
Assuming a 10% hold rate140 and equal claim values, this means that more than 250
claimants, and more than $165 million in claims, could have fallen into the settlement
trap in one case alone.
B. Elements of the Settlement Trap
What is it about settlement-trap cases that feels so problematic? Consider an
illustration: Bernard, an elderly man, underwent hip replacement surgery more than
fifteen years ago. He learned just recently that the artificial joint was defective and
required a second debilitating surgery. Bernard joined a mass tort action, receiving a
significant settlement award to redress his injuries. He was shocked, however, when
the MDL claims administrator refused to turn over the award to him or his personal
injury attorney. Instead, because Bernard had previously filed for bankruptcy, the
claims administrator refused to distribute the funds until a bankruptcy trustee or the
bankruptcy court certified that the funds were not property of the estate. Bernard was
left with no choice but to hire a bankruptcy attorney to fight with the trustee about
whether the claim accrued before the bankruptcy and if Bernard could claim an
exemption for the settlement. For Bernard, the settlement trap led to substantially
increased costs and additional time spent waiting for the settlement money he

136.
137.
138.
139.

Debtors’ Attorney, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
See BrownGreer PLC, NFL Settlement Program Summary Report, NFL CONCUSSION
SETTLEMENT 8 (May 10, 2021), https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Docs/5_10_21
_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYC4-JPZB].
140. The claims administrator explained that cases are likely to be closer to 10% when the
population of claimants is more likely to have filed for bankruptcy and identified the NFL case
as one example where a claims administrator might hold 10% of cases for potential bankruptcy
issues. Claims Administrator, supra note 13.
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desperately needed. In the settlement trap, substantive, procedural, and structural
factors in two colliding systems overlap to leave injured claimants unaware of the
law, without control of the process, and paying the costs of pursuit. This Section
outlines the core elements of the settlement trap.
1. Legal Complexity
At the most fundamental level, the settlement trap is possible because the
underlying law on accrual, exemption, and judicial estoppel is incredibly
complicated. Decisions that a claimant made in his bankruptcy decades ago may have
binding effect on a newly discovered claim; similarly, characteristics of a claimant’s
settlement that come to light decades after a bankruptcy has closed can ultimately
determine whether that settlement goes to the claimant. Hindsight may be 20/20, but
claimants in these circumstances would have to be clairvoyant legal experts to escape
the settlement trap. The attorneys who are involved usually do not know the full legal
landscape to offer comprehensive advice, and the law may change over time to shift
outcomes in unpredictable ways.
2. Loss of Control
By the time most claimants know about potential problems with their settlement
payment, they have likely lost all control to guide the process. The claims
administrator (according to settlement program terms) controls whether the claimant
falls under, and whether he can escape, a bankruptcy hold. A trustee with even a
colorable argument that a claim is estate property is the sole party in interest who
may take action on the claim. In that capacity, a trustee may settle away exemptions
or surplus, or accept terms a claimant would not want. The trustee may also dictate
settlement terms that force the claimant to surrender property that would be hers.141
The claimant is stuck with very little recourse.
3. Prohibitive Costs
Adding insult to injury, a claimant who is ensnared by complicated law and
overtaken by loss of control is also required to pay the costs of administration and
challenges over his claim. Claimants in the settlement trap may be desperate for
settlement funds, but if their claim is flagged for bankruptcy hold by the claims
administrator or captured by the trustee, then the only path to recovery involves
spending money. The claimant may ask the trustee to abandon the payment, but if
the trustee exercises its discretion to take control over the asset, then the claimant
must pay for a bankruptcy lawyer, in addition to potentially being responsible for the
trustee’s and counsel’s fees from litigating over the claim.142 Claimants may incur

141. One debtors’ attorney shared a story about a client who was initially told by a trustee
that a potential NFL claim was not property of the estate, only to come back once a larger
claim was awarded and demand $100,000 payment as a price for peace. Given the delay and
cost of administration and the legal uncertainty, the debtor decided to take the deal even though
the property was likely fully exempt. Debtors’ Attorney, supra note 16.
142. Recall that trustee and counsel fees may be approved by the court as administrative
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additional harm due to the resulting delays. Because the claims administration hold
can take a long time to resolve, claimants may be pushed to take litigation finance
loans or other financially unsound measures.
C. Who Sets the Trap?
No problem can be solved until it is reduced to some simple form. The
changing of a vague difficulty into a specific, concrete form is a very
essential element in thinking. – J. P. Morgan143
In the settlement trap, a claimant with a settlement awarded may be forced to
surrender control of key decisions, endure the cost and delay of seeking payment,
and ultimately lose the payment after receiving insufficient advice on complex laws.
This is possible because multiple stakeholders in both the mass tort and the
bankruptcy systems have unclear or conflicted duties, too much discretion, and
opportunistic incentives. While not all cases will involve every element described in
this Section, collecting them will provide a useful foundation for evaluating the
strategy for reform.
1. The Blame Game
When speaking with stakeholders to understand the settlement trap, my first
impression was that everybody (1) agreed there was a problem and (2) had strong
opinions about who was responsible. As one may have expected, there was little
consensus about who the “bad actors” were and plenty of fault to go around. This
Section provides a snapshot into the blame game that ensued.
Many stakeholders voiced frustration with defendants’ and lead plaintiffs’
counsel. One interviewee—who calls himself a “garden variety personal injury
attorney” who occasionally does mass torts—was appalled by the fundamental
disconnect between class attorneys and their clients. “In mass tort cases the rule of
law that we teach isn’t being followed. It’s a free-for-all, where the defendant calls
the shots and the plaintiffs’ attorney lead counsel gets paid a ton, while people who
need their money don’t get it.”144 As another plaintiffs’ attorney explained, “I think
the defense side has figured out ways to increase the process so that things get slowed
down, the whole idea of delaying the pay out, and then it gets checked [for
bankruptcy issues], all to the detriment of the claimant who nobody really cares
about.”145 A lawyer representing former NFL players complained that
[e]verybody has gotten paid through this NFL case except the actual
players who deserve to get paid. It’s terrible. It was not meant to be a

claims, which would be paid in full out of funds that remain after a debtor exempts her
property, but before unsecured creditors receive any distribution (or the debtor a surplus).
143. KAREN LAWSON, THE TRAINER’S HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: TOOLS,
TECHNIQUES, AND ACTIVITIES (John Wiley & Sons, Aug. 2, 2011).
144. Plaintiffs’ Attorney 3, supra note 129.
145. Plaintiffs’ Attorney 2, supra note 15.
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case run that way, but that’s how they are doing these mass torts, the
same gang of lawyers doing it the same way, hiring the same companies
to be administrators and lien administrators, etc. It’s really pathetic.146
Other participants look to the cost of overseeing the settlement program. “In the NFL
case, the administrator makes as much money as it wants to make. The way that one
is set up, it behooves the lawyers and everybody involved to do as much work as
possible, all out of the claimant’s pocket.”147
Plaintiffs’ attorneys faced scrutiny for their unwillingness to yield to valid
bankruptcy issues. One trustee bemoaned that:
[i]t can be difficult getting information out of [plaintiffs’] attorneys, even
though you hire them as “special counsel” in the bankruptcy case. They
rarely have a lot of knowledge about bankruptcy, at heart. . . . They don’t
want to send the money to the trustee. They try to set off attorney’s fees,
but instead the money has to come through the estate.148
A claims administrator expressed similar frustration: “Lawyers representing
plaintiffs, class counsel, and also defendants don’t know much bankruptcy, and they
don’t want to talk about it, it’s a ‘fly in the ointment’ or a ‘wrench in the system’ that
they don’t really want to deal with.”149
Other parties—including plaintiffs’ attorneys, debtors’ attorneys, and judges—
say that trustees are responsible. “The only ones who made any money are the trustee
and the attorney for the trustee. They made all sorts of money on the bankruptcy and
hold up distribution of the award to my clients.”150 A nationally recognized Chapter
7 trustee summarized the problem:
In slow times like these, trustees may get a little more aggressive because
they are losing money in their practices and are incentivized to do maybe
the wrong thing. . . . I’ve seen trustees who are reopening cases for the
“smaller” settlements, and then they have the fights on their hand. By the
time they finish litigating it, what’s left? Every trustee has to exercise his
or her own business judgment . . . but that culture varies by region. In
more rural areas, with very few bankruptcies, a $3000 judgment would
be considered a big case.151
From a global perspective, each of these criticisms may be valid. The net sum of
failures is what creates the settlement trap, not any one party’s actions.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Plaintiffs’ Attorney 4, supra note 14.
Plaintiffs’ Attorney 2, supra note 15.
Telephone Interview with Trustee 2 (Sept. 25, 2019).
Claims Administrator, supra note 13.
Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note 6.
Trustee 1, supra note 17.
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2. Duties
A claimant in the settlement trap is often completely unaware that his claim is not
recoverable, either because it is tied up in a claims administrator bankruptcy hold or
held hostage in a battle with the trustee. In part, claimants’ ignorance results from
problems with the professional and fiduciary duties they are owed. In a given case,
the plaintiffs’ attorney, debtors’ attorney, trustee, and even aggregate litigation
counsel will all owe duties of some sort to a claimant. But despite this seemingly
comprehensive list of stakeholders acting on behalf of the claimant, critical
information about settlement payments gets lost.
First, in this context some stakeholders have conflicting duties. The trustee, for
example, owes a fiduciary duty to collect and distribute funds on behalf of available
creditors.152 However, the trustee also owes a fiduciary duty to the debtor, to the
extent an asset would be exempt or result in a surplus.153 A certain conflict arises
when the trustee is tasked with making decisions that would benefit one party and
harm another (for example, settling a lawsuit for less money than possible in the
interest of time, but thereby eliminating the debtor’s ability to get a surplus).154
Aggregate litigation counsel, too, may be conflicted.155 Whether in a class action,
multidistrict litigation, or simply when acting on behalf of many claimants, counsel
negotiating an aggregate settlement owes duties to multiple parties. Due to the
differences in clients’ claims, counsel will likely make decisions about the settlement
that will be in the best interests of one client but not another.156 This conflict may be
satisfied for professional responsibility purposes by waivers or consent.157 However,
none of those safeguards will help claimants with potential bankruptcy issues. For

152. This suggests that a trustee would be in violation of his fiduciary duty if he took action
(and incurred costs) without returning a meaningful recovery to creditors. See infra note 185.
153. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. TRS., HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES
4-2 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/handbook_for_chapter_7_trustees.pdf/download
[https://perma.cc/NGD7-3VP5] (“The trustee is a fiduciary charged with protecting the
interests of all estate beneficiaries – namely, all classes of creditors, including those holding
secured, administrative, priority, and non-priority unsecured claims, as well as the debtor’s
interest in exemptions and in any possible surplus property.”); see also In re Leavell, 141 B.R.
393, 399 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992) (noting the Chapter 7 trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the
debtor if it “has an interest, e.g., a right of exemption in estate property, that may be harmed
by the trustee’s failure to preserve assets”).
154. See Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 148–49 (2006) (outlining conflicts in the
trustee’s exercise of its fiduciary duties). See generally Pottow, supra note 51 (discussing the
inherent conflicts in trustee representation).
155. See Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 295–98 (2015) (describing the different roles that
settling attorneys may play depending upon the form of aggregate litigation).
156. Consider the difference between claimants with a strong claim that would rather
proceed to litigation versus clients with potential proof issues that are incentivized to settle
early and for lower amounts. See id. at 296–97.
157. See id. at 295; see also Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit
All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95
B.U. L. REV. 109, 140–41 (2015) (describing the ethical obligations of attorney representation
and how those obligations are strained in the MDL context).
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example, the client who should try and settle a claim to qualify for exemptions may
not receive sufficient advocacy from an aggregate litigation attorney who knows that
the settlement value for all claimants could increase by going along with the
defendants’ requests that would disqualify the payment from exempt status
Next, other stakeholders owe duties to the claimant, but the scope of those duties
leaves a gap in critical advice. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are not experts in bankruptcy law
and would likely be acting in violation of their professional obligations by making
misinformed bankruptcy recommendations.158 More commonly, plaintiffs’ attorneys
who identify potential bankruptcy issues refer claimants to contact an experienced
consumer bankruptcy attorney. Yet another group of plaintiffs’ attorneys have no
idea that a long-dormant bankruptcy could be reopened for settlement payments and
are just as surprised as their clients to be denied payment.159 For their part, debtors’
attorneys are not well-versed in mass tort settlement protocols, and may not know
the most effective way to coordinate with claims administrators or even still represent
the debtor when any mass tort claim accrues. Especially in dormant bankruptcies, no
single attorney has the right combination of expertise and access to the client to
navigate or avoid the settlement trap. For claimants without debtors’ or plaintiffs’
counsel, the information disadvantage only magnifies.
3. Discretion
The settlement trap is further enabled by certain stakeholders’ discretionary
authority. First, the parties who draft mass tort settlement programs have discretion
to set specific terms by which claimants are paid. This includes when potential
bankruptcy issues are subject to the claims administrators’ bankruptcy hold, and
when the claimant has provided sufficient proof to escape that hold.160 Claims
administrators are bound by the terms of the settlement program in each case, even
if a claimant in one case would be paid without question while that same claim would
be delayed in a different case. In close cases, or if the claimants’ attorney comes back
with clarifying information, the claims administrator will look to the defendant to
allow an exception.
The stakeholder with the most significant discretion is the trustee. As described
above, in most instances a mass tort claimant will receive his settlement payment
unless the trustee takes action to recover it. For example, if a bankruptcy is closed,
the trustee will reopen a case to pursue the settlement. Trustees are bound to act on
behalf of the estate but have discretion to identify when the estate would benefit from
pursuing a settlement. Tucked within this discretion are the trustee’s decisions about
whether the settlement payment is property of the estate and/or exempt. Because the

158. See supra text accompanying note 128 (recounting an instance when attorney error
led to disqualification from a significant award).
159. As one plaintiffs’ attorney explained, “I have no separate duty and obligation to go
back in time when someone settles a case. When I settle asbestos mesothelioma cases, I don’t
think I have any ethical obligation to disclose that to previous creditors.” Plaintiffs’ Attorney
4, supra note 14.
160. Most often, the defendant’s counsel, in partnership with representatives from the
plaintiffs’ group, draft the terms of a settlement program. See Claims Administrator, supra
note 13.
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law surrounding each characteristic of settlement payments may be largely unsettled,
the trustee has significant power over the debtor’s ability to successfully claim an
exemption. Trustees exercise discretion in reopening closed bankruptcy cases to
pursue settlement payments; in taking over and settling pending cases; and in
challenging a debtor’s claim that property is exempt. The trustee’s interests in
settling a claim do not always align with the debtor’s. As outlined in Section I.B
above, whether a particular settlement qualifies for exemption may turn on nuanced
elements of the settlement (such as whether the settlement is for pain and suffering
versus bodily harm, or lost wages as opposed to damage to property).161 In deciding
how and when to settle cases, a trustee has the ability to seek terms that pull the
resulting award away from the debtor’s exemption.
It bears mentioning that this Article does not assert that the nation’s trustees are,
en masse, abusing discretion to the detriment of debtors. There is currently no data
to support any empirical claim about the overall pattern of trustee behavior on this
issue.162 Anecdotally, I spoke with trustees who use the very same discretion
explained above to abandon claims or not object to exemptions, thereby permitting
settlement payments to flow to the debtor. Debtors’ attorneys also recognize the
possibility that some trustees take a limited approach to interfering with
settlements.163 At times, trustees exercise this discretion in favor of the claimant in
direct contradiction to guidance from the trustee’s oversight authority.164 While the
data-driven story of trustee behavior remains untold, this Article focuses on the rules
that would permit a trustee to thwart the public policy of exemption and identifies
structural safeguards to remove that possibility.165 The next Section explores the
incentive structure that may motivate trustees and other stakeholders to exercise
discretion to the detriment of claimants.

161. See supra Section I.B.
162. The issue of whether and how trustees decide to abandon or pursue litigation and
settlement payments in bankruptcy is both fascinating, and worthy of empirical assessment
beyond the scope of this Article. My experience with this project suggests that the norms are
highly regionalized and vary based on a mix of factors including state exemption and accrual
law, the perspective of the local bench, and the overall volume and value of consumer cases
in the district.
163. “In defense of the trustees, I will say there are trustees in the area who think the
trustees who are going after my guys are crazy. There is definitely a split in trustees.” Debtors’
Attorney, supra note 16. This split may also explain why represented debtors are more likely
to try and manipulate the random assignment system for a preferred trustee. See Edward R.
Morrison, Belisa Pang & Jonathon Zytnick, Manipulating Random Assignment: Evidence
from Consumer Bankruptcies in the Nation’s Largest Cities 5, (Colum. Univ. Dep’t Econ.
Working Paper No. 614, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3539&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/8QCT-CQPZ].
164. Multiple trustees disclosed a stated policy preference from the U.S. Trustee’s office
about how to handle personal injury settlement payments in closed cases. Trustees also
explained their willingness to go against the policy preferences when exercising their
discretion.
165. Any effort for reform should prevent the more troubling abuses of discretion and
balance the information disparity among claimant and trustee (or claims administrator) while
maintaining core objectives of the bankruptcy and mass tort systems.
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4. Incentives
Why do stakeholders exercise their discretion related to settlements in a way that
often harms claimants? At its core, much of the problematic behavior is incentivized
by money. Both bankruptcy and mass tort practices indulge attorneys’ and other
administrators’ quests for fees or cost savings. Scholars have outlined in great detail
how each system benefits the connected, repeat players.166 In this context, claimants
must endure both sets of incentive challenges.
i. Financial Incentives of Settlement Administration
A settlement program’s terms and the manner in which it is administered are both
heavily impacted by costs and fees. The terms of a settlement program, including
how it addresses claims with potential bankruptcy issues, will vary based upon the
fee structure. The cost of claims administration can be staggering, and different
features in the fee agreement can make it more or less likely that a claimant will
receive payment.
First, a bit of background on settlement programs cost structures and claims
administrator fees. Usually, settlement program administrative costs are paid either
directly from the settlement funds, or separately by the defendant in addition to any
settlement amount. In the former scenario, the defendant has no incentive to
streamline program costs because their contribution remains the same. The
defendant’s primary incentive, then, is to ensure as many releases as possible and
reduce the claims pool via other means. In the latter circumstance, where every
administration dollar is an additional cost to the defendant, the incentive structure
shifts, and it is plaintiffs who are uninterested in the cost while defendants are
conflicted between a desire to reduce costs and a desire to effectively reduce their
current and future liability.
The claims administrator payment structure further complicates this incentive
issue. Claims administrators are paid through a number of fee arrangements, each of
which may incentivize different approaches to administering special handling cases
(such as claims with potential bankruptcy issues).167 One model involves paying
claims administrators at an hourly rate, while another method (the unit-price model)
offers a flat rate for every claim they administer. Competition is fierce in the claims
administrator industry, and debtors and lead plaintiffs’ counsel use that reality to
push claims administrators toward more advantageous terms.
Both compensation methods may impact how claims administrators deal with
bankruptcy holds. In a case with hourly compensation, the claims administrator
might be motivated to conduct more investigations into claimants with bankruptcy
issues, thereby increasing the fees.168 In the unit-price model, the terms of the price

166. See BURCH, supra note 122 (explaining the insular relationships and fee-seeking
decision-making in MDL negotiations); Pottow, supra note 51, at 16.
167. The information in this Section comes exclusively from my interviews with wellestablished claims administrators but is by no means exhaustive or universal. See Claims
Administrator, supra note 13. The details of settlement fund administration and the incentives
at play merit careful attention and future focus from academics.
168. The fear of losing future business may mitigate excessive hourly billing in this
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could incentivize the way claims administrators treat borderline claims involving
potential bankruptcy issues. For example, one claims administrator explained that
sometimes, the per-claimant fee will be a flat sum (say, $500),169 while in other cases
there may be a tiered fee (perhaps $500 for regular claims and $650 for special
handling claims that involve bankruptcy).170 Under the flat-sum structure, a claims
administrator is incentivized to finalize and approve claims as quickly as possible. In
close cases (perhaps instances where the claimants’ proof could arguably fall on
either side of the program line, or where the initial payment seems potentially
impacted), the claims administrator is incentivized to finalize the payment. With
tiered fees, the claims administrator may be incentivized to categorize more claims
within the bankruptcy hold to earn the additional fee.
When combined, the program funding source and claims administrator fee
structures impose different incentives on claimants in different cases that may result
in inconsistent and self-interested treatment of claims with potential bankruptcy
issues.
ii. Costs of Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy process also has incentive issues arising out of fees. As explained
above, the trustee’s fees are paid out of the debtor’s estate. This creates a “financial
incentive to identify and recover non-exempt property.”171 Trustees receive a small
flat fee for no-asset cases, which make up the vast majority of many districts’
dockets.172 As one debtors’ attorney explained:
The trustees, all they see are dollar signs. The whole bankruptcy system
is set up so being a trustee isn’t worth your while unless you can get some
big asset cases. So, the trustees do this work, in hopes of being able to
get a big asset case. If you see a million dollar case, and you’re going to
get a cut of that, it makes it worth your while to make up for all the $60
cases you’ve had.173

context, but given the secrecy surrounding the costs of settlement programs, there is no way
to know whether the bills receive sufficient scrutiny to identify opportunistic billing.
169. While single-fee terms may seem more cost effective, the claims administrators
pointed out that contracts often have a carve out for “complicating factors” that results in
hidden and significant fee increases. Claims Administrator, supra note 13.
170. Id. (reporting the possibility of a 10–25% additional unit fee for special handling
cases).
171. Morrison et al., supra note 163, at 5 (“[The trustee] is paid a $60 administrative fee
for every case and, in addition, 25 percent of the first $5,000 of non-exempt property liquidated
for the benefit of creditors, 10 percent of the next $25,000, 5 percent of the next $950,000, and
3 percent of any amount over $1 million. These bounties, however, are collected in a tiny
percentage of cases: Cases with nonexempt assets account for only about 4 percent of all
cases.”). Recent scholarship highlights that represented debtors are statistically more likely to
engage in “trustee shopping,” likely to avoid particularly harmful exercises of discretion. Id.
at 16.
172. Id.
173. Debtors’ Attorney, supra note 16.
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Trustees only receive fees on the non-exempt portion of estate assets. Thus, trustees
are incentivized to nudge assets like settlement payments—which are under the
trustee’s control—outside the boundaries of available exemptions. This may be a
valid exercise of the trustee’s role, but in instances where the facts are not clear cut,
it also opens up the potential for abuse. This is especially true when a trustee
challenges the status of an asset that is likely exempt solely to gain leverage to extract
a settlement from the debtor.174 Multiple bankruptcy attorneys and trustees identified
this issue, while also acknowledging that exemption gamesmanship is two-sided. “It
can work both ways, you can have the debtor’s attorneys trying to angle [for
exemptions] or the trustee.”175
The fee structure for debtors’ attorneys also plays a role in this conflict. Many
debtors’ attorneys earn a flat fee for their representation that is not impacted by the
amount of work required for a particular case.176 They represent clients on a volume
basis and have limited capacity to engage in relentless briefing and appeals on a
single debtor’s case. “On a flat fee basis, debtor’s attorneys can’t afford to fight
everything, and everybody knows that.”177 Trustees take advantage of these fee
limitations to push debtors and their attorneys to accept settlements on issues that
would likely go to the debtor if litigated.178
The settlement trap is also fueled by decisions made to avoid losing money. The
claims administrator, for example, insists on significant documentation to release
claims potentially impacted by bankruptcy to avoid liability under its engagement
with mass tort defendants.179 Mass tort defendants, in turn, are incentivized by
concerns about future litigation when they push for draconian proof mechanisms to
release settlements from a bankruptcy hold. In class action cases, the proof required
to release a bankruptcy hold claim may be less arduous because the settlement
provides a binding release on all present or absent claimants. But in MDLs or other
aggregate cases, the defendant’s only repose comes from releases on an individual
basis. If the settlement is an asset of the estate, then only the trustee has authority to
sign the release.180 In such cases, defendants have strong incentives to seek more
certainty about which party has the authority to release claims against the defendant.

174. One debtors’ attorney provided several examples of such behavior with a particular
trustee. Id.
175. Trustee 1, supra note 17.
176. Debtors’ Attorney, supra note 16.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., In re Boyher, 467 B.R. 672, 673 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012) (describing an
example where the case was reopened, the debtor scheduled a class action settlement payment,
and the debtor and trustee agreed to split the proceeds fifty-fifty with the debtor waving his
right to claim exemptions).
179. Claims Administrator, supra note 13.
180. Settlement program release forms often pose challenging issues when trustees have
standing to administer the claim. Release forms commonly require secrecy, something that is
completely antithetical to the open disclosure norms and requirements of the bankruptcy
system. Additionally, many settlement forms have broad release and indemnification terms
that the trustee is either unable or unwilling to sign. Some defendants understand the difference
between what reasonable release terms may be for a claimant versus for a trustee, but others
refuse to budge and place the trustee in the difficult position of deciding whether to accept the
money and accept the potential personal liability that could come from signing the release.
Trustee 1, supra note 17; Trustee 2, supra note 148.
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This, in turn, makes it harder for claimants to escape the claims administrator’s
bankruptcy hold. Finally, defendants have an incentive to investigate claimants’ prior
bankruptcies to wage as many judicial estoppel defenses as possible. If successful,
the defendant can pay one fewer claimant.
III. THE RELEASE
Not one individual interviewed for this Article was satisfied with the existing
system for evaluating and resolving settlement payments to current or prior debtors.
If, as outlined above, a tangled web of laws, practices, and procedures creates a
settlement trap for claimants, and stakeholders uniformly see a need for reform, the
obvious next step is to identify and pursue meaningful changes. Any adjustments
must be in harmony with the underlying goals of the various statutory schemes.
Bankruptcy, for example, balances competing interests of maximizing estate value,
distributing assets equitably among creditors, and providing the debtor with a fresh
start. And the mass tort system seeks to aggregate and resolve a large number of
claims against a defendant (or defendants) and facilitate an orderly process for
distributing recoveries. This Part outlines a number of measures that could address
the more troubling parts of the settlement trap identified above. Some are directed at
the mass tort system, while others fall within the bankruptcy process (where they will
improve bankruptcy’s treatment of litigation as an asset beyond mass tort claims).
Together, the changes offer a blueprint for releasing the settlement trap.
A. Demystifying the Doctrine
Attorneys in all roles noted the doctrinal complexity surrounding the treatment of
settlement payments in bankruptcy. While the bankruptcy bench and bar (including
trustees, debtors’ attorneys, and judges) were more likely to have knowledge of the
issues, even those who routinely deal with the issue in bankruptcy found the doctrine
confusing to explain or apply on a national level. The law on key issues—accrual,
exemptions, and estoppel—is hyper-specific to the debtor’s jurisdiction and is
constantly shifting as more cases are tried. Non-bankruptcy stakeholders (including
plaintiffs’ and class attorneys and settlement administrators) described their
knowledge of relevant bankruptcy law along a spectrum from a vague awareness to
a cautious understanding.181 This first set of modifications aims to make navigating
the legal landscape easier for claimants and other stakeholders in the process.
1. Judicial interpretation
The first set of demystification efforts could be accomplished incrementally
through advocacy. By continuing to challenge treatment of mass tort payments in
bankruptcy courts, claimants will nudge judges to clarify open doctrinal questions.

181. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Attorney 1, supra note 6 (“I know some basic bankruptcy law.”);
Claims Administrator, supra note 13 (“Most of the time the lawyers dealing with this are not
bankruptcy lawyers who don’t know what should be done and don’t want to do anything. We
are usually met with resistance, consternation and complaining. Nobody knows and
understands it.”).
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In the last five years, litigation on settlement issues has produced a flurry of opinions
that address missing elements.182 In the NFL CTE cases, for example, courts have
conceptualized the settlement payments as disability payments, which are eligible
for different and more generous exemptions.183 This shift has adjusted the way that
trustees respond to NFL settlements, including making it more likely that they
abandon the settlement without challenge.184 Relying on the courts to recalibrate
existing practices, however, will take time, may lead to more inconsistency
throughout the country, and will impose significant costs on claimants.185
2. Legislative Changes
An alternative solution involves changing the Bankruptcy Code (and/or state
laws)186 to simplify the analysis surrounding settlement payments. This legislative
fix could take many forms, but two obvious improvements relate to timing of accrual
and creating a uniform personal injury exemption.
First, Congress should create a uniform framework for deciding whether a
litigation claim or settlement payment is an asset of the estate. State laws on claim
accrual are not designed with bankruptcy in mind. Whether or when a cause of action
should be time-barred (the primary purpose of accrual laws) is a profoundly different
query than whether a recovery should belong to the bankruptcy estate, and blind
reliance on state provisions leads to absurd results.187 A discovery rule that turns on
actual or potential knowledge of the injury comes closest to aligning with the aims

182. The number of bankruptcy opinions arising out of the most recent wave of mass tort
cases is particularly striking when compared to the relative silence after previous cases. For
example, there are very few, if any, cases discussing exemption and reopening of bankruptcy
cases for Agent Orange, asbestos, or Dalkon Shield cases, even though such cases should have
produced many similar claimants.
183. In re Williams, 586 B.R. 355 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2018) (overruling Chapter 7 trustee’s
objection to claim of exemption in National Football League player’s concussion injury
litigation settlement), aff’d, No. 18-cv-61581 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
184. This decision is economically rational due to the priority scheme of the Code. When
distributing assets, the value of exempt property is removed from the estate and given in full
to the debtor before any administrative costs (including the trustee’s and its attorneys’ fees)
are paid or distributions made to creditors. If the entire settlement amount is exempt, the
trustee’s efforts to recover it will benefit neither creditors nor the trustee itself.
185. In addition to the obvious challenges regarding accrual, exemptions, and estoppel,
claimants could pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against the trustee who administers a
settlement payment without benefit to creditors or who takes settlement actions that diminish
the debtor’s interest in an exemption. Such claims are certainly viable, though challenging to
assert given existing precedent on trustee immunity. See Pottow, supra note 51, at 27
(outlining the current immunity doctrine relating to trustee actions); Elizabeth H. McCullough,
Bankruptcy Trustee Liability: Is There a Method in the Madness?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV
153, 175 (2011) (exploring the trustee’s fiduciary duties and the potential causes of action
against the trustee).
186. Although the focus of this Section is on federal legislative reform, state legislatures
could significantly improve the problem by clarifying their exemption and/or accrual
provisions or incorporating federal law. See Sullivan, supra note 19 at 345 (suggesting states
adopt bankruptcy-specific provisions).
187. See supra Section I.C.1 (describing treatment of any pre-petition placement of a
device as an asset of the estate).
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of the bankruptcy process. If the debtor knew or should have known about his claim
or injury prior to the petition date (or during the plan in Chapter 13 cases), then the
claim and any resulting settlement payment should be property of the estate.
Under this standard, the estate of a football player who knew about his
concussions and degenerative disease before filing for bankruptcy would include any
settlement in the NFL MDL case; it would not, however, include a settlement paid
to a woman who had a hip implant prior to filing for bankruptcy but who had no
injury until years after her bankruptcy closed. To the extent Congress does not have
the appetite to address timing challenges for all litigation claims (including business
disputes), it could narrowly tailor the revision to personal injury claims. Congress
could additionally impose a maximum time period for reopening closed cases due to
mass tort claims, subject to an exception for debtors who intentionally hide or delay
their settlement. Permitting the trustee to grab settlement payments within five or ten
years of the bankruptcy accomplishes the goal of distributing assets to creditors,
while also eliminating the perpetual grasp of a bankruptcy filing.
Second, Congress could set a generous uniform exemption relating to personal
injury claims and permit opt-out state exemptions for personal injury claims to apply
only if they offer the same or greater exemption amounts. As identified in Section
I.C.2, states have set many different levels of exemptions for personal injury claims.
Imposing a uniform standard permits Congress to set a floor for how claimants are
eligible to receive payments and adds clarity to an otherwise complicated legal issue.
I recommend setting the personal injury claim exemption amount to mirror the
current federal standards for some types of payments by imposing a “reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor” standard.188
This removes the need to distinguish and allocate settlement proceeds among
categories of relief (lost wages, pain and suffering, etc.). Such a standard also
prevents debtors from receiving a windfall from a large settlement payment that is
not necessary to the debtor’s “fresh start.” Under this proposed regime, states would
be permitted to offer complete exemption of personal injury claim amounts, but not
reduce the amount below the reasonably necessary threshold. With more predictable
and blanket standards, the trustee is no longer incentivized to settle claims around
exemptions and all parties can streamline their exemption analysis.
The suggestion that Congress take control of these issues highlights longstanding
tension between state and federal interests in resolving property disputes in
bankruptcy. Current laws (relying on state accrual standards and permitting states to
opt out of the federal exemption scheme) show Congress’s desire to incorporate and
honor state principles. But this reality is more the result of effective lobbying and
federalism concerns than constitutional necessity.189 Congress has the right to create
and enforce a uniform system of bankruptcy laws,190 and would be well within its

188. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(B), (C), (E).
189. See Ponoroff, supra note 19, at 357 (describing the history of the federal exemption
scheme, including the “firestorm of opposition” to an initial recommendation for uniform
federal exemptions); COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1st Sess. 1973).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Ponoroff, supra note 19, at 355–56; Stephen J.
Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE. W. RSRV. L. REV. 319
(2013) (describing the relationship between bankruptcy and state courts).
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bounds to narrow the influence of state law on administration of the bankruptcy
estate.191 While much of the bankruptcy process rests on “applicable non-bankruptcy
law,”192 the Code clearly overrides such law when deemed necessary,193 including in
the exemption context.194
3. Other Solutions
Aside from changes to the legal landscape, increasing knowledge of current legal
standards relating to settlement payments would add clarity for all stakeholders. The
doctrinal framework in this context is ripe for development of assistive technology.
A developer could create an algorithm that could identify and categorize how the law
applies to a specific claimant’s settlement with a few data inputs (including
information about the claim and terms of the settlement; bankruptcy dates; which
state’s law applies; and what applicable law holds about accrual, exemptions, and
estoppel, etc.). Once built, and assuming accuracy, each stakeholder could readily
identify the likely legal treatment of a claim and take action accordingly. If, for
example, a settlement administrator had access to a bankruptcy treatment estimator
tool, they could release settlements that clearly are not property of the estate without
the cost and delay of getting trustee approval. Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys could
advise clients easily about the bankruptcy impact of settling cases, and trustees could
more quickly decide whether a claim should be abandoned.
Separately, the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees (EOUST) could issue formal
guidance to standardize the process among trustees.195 Currently, Chapter 7 and 13
trustees take region-specific approaches to administering settlement payments.
While trustee discretion is important, there should be some standard considerations
and baseline thresholds that limit the discretion. By publishing guidance outlining
factors such as the amount paid to creditors, time since the bankruptcy closed, and
the likelihood of returning meaningful assets to creditors, the U.S. Trustee could set
the standards by which trustees should operate and give other parties a better
understanding of how a settlement will fare under bankruptcy law. Such guidance
would serve the additional benefit of laying the foundation for removal of Chapter 7
trustees and trustee counsel for noncompliance.196
B. Structural Safeguards
Some elements of the settlement trap can only be addressed by structural shifts.
Stakeholders’ potential incentive conflicts are powerful because the mass tort and

191. Ponoroff, supra note 19, at 356; see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613
(1918) (noting the choice of Congress to honor state law in the exemption context).
192. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
193. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 545 (voiding certain statutory liens in conflict with state law).
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(3).
195. The EOUST issues guidance on various issues involving administration of bankruptcy
cases. See Significant Guidance Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 18, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/ust/significant-guidance-documents [https://perma.cc/L8GP-KA3D].
196. See John A. E. Pottow, Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties in the World of Claims Trading,
13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 90 n.21 (2018) (discussing removal of Chapter 7
trustees).
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bankruptcy systems do not impose sufficient limitations on their exercise of
discretion. Creating enhanced structural safeguards would add oversight to
controlling stakeholders such as the trustee and claims administrator and could
effectively curb some of the more problematic behavior that impacts claimants.
The first group of safeguards would limit the trustee’s discretion to pursue and
administer assets without meaningful upside to the estate. Many complaints about
the settlement trap center upon the trustee’s decision to pursue a claim or settlement
when the nonexempt amounts would not provide a significant payment to creditors
(or there were few identifiable creditors even seeking repayment). Courts could
address this problem by imposing careful limitations when granting a trustee’s
motion to reopen a bankruptcy for the purpose of administering settlement proceeds.
A bankruptcy court could draft the order to apply on a temporary basis and make
administration of the asset conditional on creditors filing claims. Although this
practice is not common on the bench, the text of the Code gives bankruptcy judges
clear discretion to refuse to reopen cases.197 If judges have full discretion to grant or
deny relief, surely they also have discretion to impose limitations on the relief when
granted.198
A second group of safeguards would address the trustee’s ability to settle litigation
to the detriment of the debtor’s interest in exemptions or surplus.199 Although the
trustee has a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the debtor when those interests are
present, the reality is that the conflicting duties imposed on the trustee will likely
marginalize protections to the debtor and favor creditors (or the trustee himself).
With this tension in mind, I suggest three potential solutions. First, the bankruptcy
court or U.S. Trustee could require inclusion of a statement summarizing potential
exemption implications as part of a 9019 motion to approve settlements.200 At
minimum, this addition would improve notice to the debtor about what the impact of
a settlement may be and give them a meaningful opportunity to challenge the
settlement terms. Second, the court could require debtor approval of settlement offers
in cases where there is potential for an exemption or surplus.201 Canadian insolvency
law, which has a similar exemption scheme, gives the debtor and trustee joint
standing to pursue claims that could result in distributions to both the debtor and

197. See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b); see also In re Ross, 548 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2016) (noting the court’s discretion).
198. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988)
(observing that the government’s ability to prohibit speech entirely would include its lesser
power to use grant discretionary speech licenses).
199. This could happen, for example, if the trustee finalizes a settlement agreement that
classifies a settlement as a category that is not eligible for exemption.
200. Unfortunately, the circuits are divided as to whether a trustee is required to seek court
approval to settle litigation. See Linhadley Eljach, Comment, No Seal No Deal: Amending
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 to Require Judicial Approval of Settlement
Agreements, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 433 (2016) (outlining the split of authority on Rule
9019 and proposing reform). Whether or not the costs of requiring court approval of all
settlements is justified, the case for requiring notice and approval in the personal injury
context—where trustees are incentivized to settle litigation outside the grasp of the debtor’s
exemptions—seems very strong.
201. This idea, at least in the context of cases where a large settlement would exceed the
debtor’s obligations, mirrors that of an equity committee appointed in business bankruptcy
cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102.

2021]

THE SETTLEMENT TRAP

699

estate.202 Finally, the court could require an independent counsel or ombudsman to
review settlement of claims where the debtor has a potential exemption or surplus
interest. This additional check could be from the U.S. Trustee203 or special counsel
appointed for this purpose.204 Whatever adjustment is made, the court must consider
the increased costs to ensure that it does not simply impose one more administrative
drain on the claimant’s settlement.
C. Preventing Disregard for Time and Money
A final category of potential reforms would specifically target the staggering
cost—both in time and in money—for claimants to overcome the settlement trap.
First, there should be a streamlined procedure for claimants to get their payment
released from claims administrators. This could be accomplished in a number of
ways, including by creating a negative notice structure for releasing payments under
a certain dollar threshold. For example, a mass tort judge could establish and approve
procedures that permit settlement administrators to distribute settlement amounts
under a $20,000 threshold to claimants if the U.S. Trustee does not respond to notice
within thirty days by either requesting more time or asserting an interest in the
property. Different thresholds could provide similar relief, and the specific
components of this reform should be decided with the guidance of empirical data
surrounding (1) the average size of settlement awards that fall within the settlement
trap; and (2) the average turnaround time for similar actions in U.S. Trustee offices
around the nation. This reform would give the settlement administrators a more
certain and time-limited mechanism to establish entitlement to settlement payments
in the bankruptcy context. Because the dollar cap is designed to be relatively small,
the impact to potential creditors is modest and there is little risk of upending
fundamental principles of the bankruptcy system.
Second, the bankruptcy court could impose limitations on the trustee’s litigation
efforts for settlement payments.205 Fee limitations would counteract the trustee’s
structural incentive to overadminister estate assets for the purpose of generating fees.
Because the court must approve trustee and special counsel fees as an administrative

202. Robert A. Klotz, Bankrupt Tort Victims Impact of the Fourth Dimension: Time, 45
ADVOCS.’ Q. 212 (2016) (discussing Canadian insolvency law, which imposes a shared right
between trustee and debtor to pursue potentially exempt litigation).
203. The U.S. Trustee is already in place and has authority to review the trustee’s
settlement decisions. Perhaps the U.S. Trustee could serve this independent check function,
though I suggest that additional guidance from EOUST would be necessary to deviate from
existing practices that defer to trustees. The role of the U.S. Trustee is important in the
bankruptcy system, but it faces a number of criticisms from the bankruptcy bar and may be
too conflicted to serve in this role. See Simon, supra note 45, at 1311–14 (describing the U.S.
Trustee’s challenges and impact in the bankruptcy system).
204. In re Key, 255 B.R. 217, 221 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000) (“The cause of action for
employment discrimination should be prosecuted for the mutual benefit of the debtor and the
bankruptcy estate in a cooperative effort. The trustee should consider retention of debtor's
existing special counsel to represent the estate and the debtor in prosecution of the claim.”).
205. This suggestion is complementary to the proposed structural safeguards surrounding
motions to reopen in the previous subsection.
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expense,206 the court could impose some threshold for fees that mirrors some class
action payout structures that award fees based upon actual distributions to
claimants.207 One option would be to only approve litigation fees as administrative
claims up to a certain percentage of total money returned to creditors. Imagine that a
25% recovery threshold were imposed.208 If the claimant received a $10,000
settlement, $5000 of which was exempt, then the trustee’s counsel fee would be
capped at 25% of the amount that was distributed to creditors. If you assume that
creditors filed just $4000 in claims, then the trustee would be limited to a $1000
administrative claim. If only $2000 of claims were filed, the trustee would make
$500. This structure incentivizes trustees to pursue settlement payments
proportionate to the amount of funds available to creditors and the number of
creditors who would claim an interest in the property.209 Any remaining amount
would be returned to the claimant.
CONCLUSION
Mass tort victims commonly face financial struggles as a result of the harm they
suffered. The settlement trap imposed by bankruptcy increases that struggle and
threatens the availability of a true fresh start. As the nation deals with an influx of
mass tort cases over the coming years—including those involving vaping, opioids,
talc, and pesticides, in addition to traumatic brain injuries and pelvic mesh—the
number of settlements that fall into the settlement trap is likely to increase. The
current structure, procedures, and incentives all combine to harm claimants, a
crushing irony given their preexisting role as victims. These cases have hard facts
and unsettling outcomes, all of which have amplified and exposed a broader problem:
the current bankruptcy system has fundamental limitations for litigation claims. It is
critical that we adopt measures to clarify the law, improve procedures, and realign
incentives among stakeholders. The time has come to eliminate the settlement trap.

206. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 326–328.
207. See Elizabeth Cabraser & Andrew Pincus, Claims-Made Class-Action Settlements, 99
JUDICATURE 81 (2015).
208. This could mirror the compensation cap imposed on trustees in 11 U.S.C. § 326(a).
209. Recall that any recovered money that does not pay administrative expenses or
creditors goes back to the debtor as a surplus. By tying administrative expenses to creditor
recovery, such a proposal would guard against litigating a settlement to the detriment of the
debtor’s potential surplus.

